



CASHING IN ON CAPITOL HILL:  INSIDER TRADING AND 
THE USE OF POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE FOR PROFIT 
BUD W. JERKE† 
Government officials have recently been scrutinized for using information 
acquired in the performance of their official duties to gain market-trading ad-
vantages.  Lobbyists have similarly been criticized for collecting material non-
public political information from Capitol Hill contacts and selling it to their 
clients—notably hedge funds—who presumably use the information in their 
market transactions.  Is this insider trading?  Most likely not.  Should it be?  A 
few members of Congress have responded by introducing legislation in the past 
three Congresses that would bring trading on this “political intelligence,” by 
government insiders and outsiders, under the umbrella of the federal securities 
laws.  Unsurprisingly, the legislation has failed to garner significant political 
support.  But a renewed fervor for “cleaning up” Washington ushered in by the 
Obama Administration, coupled with the current economic crisis, has reinvigo-
rated the campaign.  The legislation was reintroduced and received a hearing 
in 2009.  In addition, recent academic scholarship is now calling for the pas-
sage of this legislation in order to bring trading on political intelligence under 
the federal insider trading regime. 
This Comment takes issue with the insider trading approach.  It argues 
that the federal securities laws are an inappropriate and ineffective legal me-
chanism for remedying issues of political ethics.  First, as it pertains to govern-
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ment insiders, this Comment recommends an ethics approach, such as manda-
tory blind trusts, to deal with financial conflicts of interest.  Second, with 
gard to outside actors, such as lobbyists and hedge funds, it argues for public 
disclosure of political-intelligence gathering activities.  This Comment argues 
against prohibiting trading on political intelligence by outside actors because 
these actors are merely the Washington equivalents of market analysts, whose 
information gathering functions are perfectly legitimate, if not desirable.  Last-
ly, this Comment warns that insider trading regulation of political intelligence 
would have two distinct chilling effects:  one on democratic process, by hamper-
ing dialogue between lawmakers and constituents, and another on market effi-
ciency, by discouraging valuable information gathering. 
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On Tuesday, November 15, 2005, day traders grew perplexed by 
irregular price fluctuations in USG Corporation’s stock.1  USG stock 
was trading at double its normal volume and gained $2.12 to close at 
$61.55.2  USG was not alone.  W.R. Grace and Crown Holdings—
companies like USG that had used asbestos materials in manufactur-
ing and that had been mired in litigation for years—experienced simi-
1 See Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 26, 2005, 
at 42 (discussing the confusion among day traders regarding increased trading of USG 
Corporation stock despite a lack of public news that would typically spur such activity). 
2 Id.; see also Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Reps. Baird and Slaughter 
Introduce Legislation to Prohibit Insider Trading on Capitol Hill (May 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/wa03_baird/stockact.html (“On Novem-
ber 15, 2005, the stock of a building materials company in Chicago (USG Corp) sud-
denly doubled, despite the fact that there was no publicly available news about the 
company, or industry, which explained the increase in volume.”). 
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lar irregular gains.3  At the same time, stock prices of peer companies 
in the same sector remained flat, as did the market as a whole.4 
The following day, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist delivered news 
promising a full Senate vote on a bill that would create a $140 billion 
government-backed trust fund for liability claims against asbestos-using 
manufacturers.5  The announcement marked a great advance for the 
legislation, which had been on Congress’s agenda for four years and 
had previously made little progress.6  A full Senate vote was welcomed 
by shareholders of affected companies, as asbestos-related litigation had 
plagued hundreds of companies that had once used asbestos in their 
manufactured goods.7  The legislation therefore had broad market im-
plications for affected companies.  One Washington lobbyist noted that 
“[e]very advancement or setback and every hint of activity on the bill 
had a direct impact on this small but well-defined group of compa-
nies.”8  To demonstrate the market effects of an asbestos-liability trust 
fund, when the Senate Judiciary Committee gave its approval to a simi-
lar bill in 2003, USG’s share price immediately rose by 8.3%, W.R. 
Grace’s by 7.9%, and Georgia-Pacific’s by 9.2%.9 
Senator Frist’s announcement, coupled with the irregular trading 
that had preceded it, drew suspicion.10  Senator Frist, who as Majority 
3 Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in Wash-




7 See id. (“For 30 years, manufacturers, trial lawyers, insurers and labor unions 
have been fighting over how to deal with more than 700,000 Americans who con-
tended they got cancer from exposure to asbestos.  The lawsuits clogged U.S. courts 
and cast uncertainty over hundreds of U.S. companies that once used asbestos in their 
products.  Dozens of companies filed for bankruptcy due to their asbestos liabilities.”). 
8 See id. (quoting Elliott Portnoy, an attorney with Sonnenschein Nath & Rosen-
thal LLP, who was hired to lobby against the asbestos legislation “on behalf of investors 
in a manufacturer that declared bankruptcy because of asbestos liabilities”). 
9 Jim Snyder, K Street Phones Wall Street:  Political Inside Info for Hedge Funds Moves 
Stock Prices, HILL, Feb. 15, 2005, at 1, available at LEXIS. 
10 See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (“SEC officials asked preliminary questions 
about how the information could have leaked.  But the agency hasn’t yet followed up 
with Mr. Frist’s office or with the Senate lawyer . . . .”); John Byrne, Democrats Want Eth-
ics Committee to Probe ‘Day Trading’ Allegations, RAW STORY, Jan. 19, 2006, 
http://www.rawstory.com/news/2005/Democrats_want_ethics_committee_to_probe_
0119.html (“House Democrats are pushing the ethics committee to investigate allega-
tions of congressional offices providing privleged [sic] information to Wall Street in-
vestors.”); Interview by Air Am. Radio, The Majority Report, with Representative Louise 
Slaughter ( Jan. 18, 2006) (“‘I’m going to track this down, I know it’s true,’ Slaughter 
told us, ‘that Frist, DeLay and probably others had some day traders working out of 
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Leader had discretion to schedule full Senate votes, had been careful 
to keep his intentions quiet.11  Nevertheless, in the two days prior to 
the public announcement, share prices of USG increased 5.4%, W.R. 
Grace jumped 4.2%, and Crown Holdings grew by 3.2%.12  The posi-
tive market reaction to the trust-fund approval by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 2003 indicated that the market would react positively 
again this time.13  But this time the bounce occurred prior to the pub-
lic announcement. 
The legislation eventually died the following February when it 
failed to receive the sixty-member vote needed “to waive a budget ob-
jection raised about the legislation.”14  The episode, however, left 
many questions surrounding the irregular trading that occurred prior 
to the official announcement of the full Senate vote:  How did materi-
al nonpublic political information find its way to the market?  
Through whose lips did the information pass?  And for whose benefit? 
The asbestos-announcement leak has been credited to the discreet 
and virtually unknown Washington practice of “political intelligence” 
gathering.15  Fueled primarily by hedge funds, K Street lobbyists (in-
their offices.’”), as quoted in Posting of Josh Orton to Daily Kos, Insider Trading in Frist 
and Delay’s [sic] Office:  Story Growing, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/ 
1/19/17445/7449 ( Jan. 19, 2006). 
11 Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3.  Senator Frist’s staff reported that they were 
careful not to tell many people of the Senator’s plans “because they wanted their boss to 
make a splash.”  Id.  An advance copy of the announcement was given to the Reuters 
news service on the evening prior to the speech, but Reuters was told that the an-
nouncement could not be published until the morning of the speech.  Id.  Additionally, 
Senator Frist conveyed the information to the bill’s sponsor, Senator Arlen Specter.  Id. 
12 Id.  These increases were “more than competitors in their respective sectors.”  
Id.  Additionally, during this time the Dow Jones Industrial Average remained “essen-
tially flat.”  Id. 
13 The market, however, did not respond with the expected optimism.  On the 
Wednesday of Senator Frist’s speech, USG prices remained flat, W.R. Grace decreased 
by 0.6%, and Crown Holdings rose 2.3%.  Id.  One possible explanation is that, by the 
time of the Wednesday announcement, the market had already adjusted to reflect the 
leaked information. 
14 Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Bill Is Sidelined by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
2006, at C1. 
15 See Javers, supra note 1, at 42 (“But the news got to key Wall Street players a day 
early via a little-known pipeline:  a small group of firms specializing in ‘political intelli-
gence’ that mine the capital for information and translate Washington wonkspeak into 
trading tips.”); Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Rep. Baird Takes on Capitol 
Hill Insider Trading (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
list/press/wa03_baird/BizWeek121605.html (“Congressman Baird tipped a reporter at 
Business Week to the ‘political intelligence’ business.  A Business Week article pub-
lished today confirms the existence of the practice and notes that, just last month, in-
vestors profited in advance of a major asbestos liability speech and policy push by Se-
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cluding lawyer-lobbyists at several prominent law firms) have cultivated 
the lucrative niche of ferreting out little-known political information 
and funneling it to Wall Street.  They translate political knowledge into 
economic profit.16  As just demonstrated, when political intelligence 
signaled that companies bogged down by asbestos litigation might be 
salvaged through a trust fund, their market value instantly rose.17 
U.S. federal securities laws police abusive insider trading practices 
that threaten the integrity of the financial markets.  Corporate insid-
ers who possess material nonpublic information about their firms are 
precluded from trading in their companies’ securities based on that 
information.18  In many instances, outsiders who receive inside “tips” 
are similarly precluded. 
In recent years, the investment behavior of elected public officials 
has received scrutiny.19  Additionally, the practice of political outsiders 
acquiring material nonpublic political information from Capitol Hill 
insiders has received a great deal of publicity.20  Hedge funds employ 
Washington lobbyists to gather political intelligence that is then pre-
sumably relied upon in making investment decisions. 
Are government insiders who trade on material nonpublic political 
information violating insider trading laws?  And are outsiders who trade 
on advance political knowledge gathered by highly paid lobbyists simi-
larly in violation of U.S. securities laws?  If not, should they be? 
nate Majority Leader Bill Frist.”); Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (“What the public 
didn’t know yet, but what some investors discovered through back channels and politi-
cal intelligence companies, was that then–Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist had quietly 
decided to move forward with legislation to relieve companies, such as USG Corp, of 
their liabilities in asbestos related lawsuits.”).  One Washington firm has gone so far as 
to claim credit for providing political intelligence in the area of asbestos reform.  See 
Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Information Capi-
tal & Political Intelligence, http://www.sonnenschein.com/docs/ 
docs_plps/Information_Capital.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
16 See infra Section I.B. 
17 For example, hedge funds would not likely invest in the bonds of a bankrupt as-
bestos-products manufacturer because there is no guarantee that the bonds would ever 
pay out.  Kristin Jensen, Mike Forsythe & J.D. Salant, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists for Inside 
Tips on U.S. Legislation, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 16, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aYbb6sQ4HmGc&refer=us.  However, “[a] hedge fund 
might take the gamble, for example, of buying an Owens Corning [a bankrupted asbes-
tos-using manufacturer] note, due in 2009, that Friday was selling for 63 cents on the dol-
lar on a bet that a settlement will allow companies to recover and pay their debts.”  Id. 
18 See infra Section II.A. 
19 See infra Section I.A. 
20 See infra Section I.B. 
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This Comment explores the relevance and application of the fed-
eral securities laws to the trading practices of actors who are privy to 
material nonpublic political information—i.e., political intelligence.  
These actors include (1) “government insiders,”21 such as politicians 
and their staff members who have direct access to inside political in-
formation,22 and (2) outside actors, such as lobbyists and investment 
funds who receive political intelligence indirectly. 
The contemporary literature dealing with government insider 
trading is relatively sparse.  Several scholars—at different times and on 
different theories—have argued that insider trading doctrine supports 
liability for government officials who trade on inside political informa-
tion.23  Others disagree and advocate a legislative solution.24  While di-
21 The term “government insider” is borrowed from Herbert Krimmel.  See Her-
bert T. Krimmel, Note, The Government Insider and Rule 10b-5:  A New Application for an 
Expanding Doctrine, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1491 (1974) (arguing that then-current doctrine 
supported extending insider trading liability to government insiders). 
22 The scope of consideration of government insiders here is limited to the legislative 
branch.  Further analysis should also examine officials and employees of the executive and 
judicial branches.  There is overlap among these various government insiders across all 
branches of government, but full treatment is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
23 In 1974, Herbert Krimmel argued that insider trading doctrine at that time suf-
ficiently supported holding government insiders accountable under federal securities 
laws.  See Krimmel, supra note 21, at 1492 (“It is the thesis of this Note that government 
insiders who use undisclosed government information for their personal benefit in the 
sale or purchase of a security have violated rule 10b-5.”).  In 1982, Professor Donald 
Langevoort agreed with Krimmel despite the Supreme Court’s substantial restriction 
of insider trading since Krimmel’s assertion a decade earlier.  See Donald C. Lange-
voort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:  A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 3-4, 34-35 (1982) (arguing that “although the majority opinion [in Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980),] clearly limits the applicability of rule 10b-5 with 
respect to trading by a person with an informational advantage over others in the mar-
ketplace, the Court’s emphasis on fiduciary duty leaves substantial flexibility for apply-
ing that rule in future cases,” which include the case of a government official who “has 
an advantageous position as compared to the persons whom he is charged with serv-
ing”).  Andrew George picked up where Krimmel and Langevoort left off and in 2008 
argued that current doctrine still supports insider trading liability for government in-
siders, albeit under the modern misappropriation theory.  See Andrew George, Public 
(Self)-Service:  Illegal Trading on Confidential Congressional Information, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 161, 163 (2008). 
24 Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge as well as a group of law students that includes 
Matthew Barbabella, Daniel Cohen, Alex Kardon, and Peter Molk separately argue that 
current federal securities doctrine cannot clearly sustain holding government insiders 
liable.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act  
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Economics Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1449744 (arguing that insider trading liability under the 
federal securities laws should be extended to members of Congress and that the Con-
stitution does not hinder such an extension); Matthew Barbabella, Daniel Cohen, Alex 
Kardon & Peter Molk, Insider Trading in Congress:  The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & 
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vided on approach, this literature shares a common desire to bring 
trading on political information by government insiders under the 
umbrella of the federal securities laws. 
This Comment takes issue with regulating political intelligence 
through federal securities law.  First, it challenges the literature’s as-
sumption that insider trading law should regulate government insiders’ 
use of political intelligence.  Second, it extends the debate beyond gov-
ernment insiders and considers the application of insider trading liabil-
ity to outside actors who trade on political information, a topic that has 
not yet been addressed and that has far-reaching ramifications. 
Part I introduces these actors and analyzes the prevalence of their 
trading practices as well as existing laws and congressional ethics rules 
that purport to curtail trading on political information.  Doing so re-
veals a deficiency in current law that allows members of Congress not 
only to trade on information acquired on the job, but also to vote on 
legislation that may materially affect their already-held investments.  
Part II provides an overview of current federal securities law and doc-
trine.  It applies this doctrine to political-intelligence trading and 
finds that current law can sustain liability only by drastically manipu-
lating current doctrine.  Part III considers legislative proposals recent-
ly introduced in the U.S. Congress and insider trading laws in the 
United Kingdom.  Specifically, it analyzes the legislation introduced in 
recent Congresses by Representatives Brian Baird and Louise Slaugh-
ter, which seeks to categorically ban trading on political information, 
as well as the U.K. law that achieves this same prohibition.  Part IV asks 
whether the theory and justifications underlying U.S. insider trading 
law support its expansion to encompass trading on political intelli-
gence and concludes that only a few of the many policy concerns ani-
mating insider trading prohibitions are relevant to political-
intelligence trading. 
Part V concludes with recommendations.  First, it advocates a legis-
lative solution that would prohibit trading on political information by 
government insiders but not under the rubric of federal securities law.  
It argues that insider trading law should not be stretched to its breaking 
point simply to remedy what is really a problem of political ethics.  Nor 
are the federal securities laws the most effective way to combat congres-
sional ethical lapses generally.  Rather, Part V proposes a requirement 
that government insiders place their assets in blind trusts, thereby meet-
SEC. L. 199, 237 (2008) (“[T]he legality of Congressional insider trading constitutes an 
unfortunate gap in securities law—one that should be filled by an amended version of 
the STOCK Act, or some other similar regulation.”). 
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ing all the concerns underlying the insider trading proposals without 
disrupting federal securities law.  This rule would require members of 
Congress to place their assets under the management of a trustee, who 
would divest the trust of the original assets known to the member and 
then make new investments.  The rule would also limit communications 
between members of Congress and the trustee so as to prevent the 
member from learning of the trust’s newly acquired assets.25  As a result, 
Part V argues, a blind-trust requirement is more effective than the insider 
trading approach.  Whereas insider trading regulation would only prec-
lude government insiders from buying or selling assets after acquiring po-
litical intelligence but before public disclosure, the blind-trust approach 
would also prevent government insiders from voting in a way that mate-
rially affects their existing market positions. 
Second, Part V proposes broad disclosure requirements on lob-
byists who are hired to ferret out political intelligence.  It does not ad-
vocate prohibiting outside actors from trading on political intelli-
gence, primarily because political-intelligence gatherers are the 
Washington equivalent of market analysts and researchers whose con-
duct is perfectly legitimate, if not desirable. 
Lastly, Part V warns that extending the federal securities laws to 
outside actors would make trading on legislative information poten-
tially incriminating and, accordingly, produce two distinct chilling ef-
fects.  First, democratic processes would be harmed by chilling critical 
dialogue between lawmakers and constituent groups.  Second, market 
efficiency would be jeopardized by discouraging information gather-
ing that functions to efficiently deliver knowledge to the marketplace. 
This Comment explores relationships between some of the most vi-
lified actors in the public sphere today.  Recent political scandals and 
controversies have brought to light flagrant instances of illegal and un-
ethical conduct of some elected officials,26 conduct that was aided in 
25 See infra notes 302-09 and accompanying text.   
26 Several members of Congress have given up or lost their seats in recent years be-
cause of involvement in corruption scandals.  Members include Senator Ted Stevens (R-
AK) in 2008, Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) in 2007, Representative Tom DeLay (R-
TX) in 2006, and Representative Duke Cunningham (R-CA) in 2005.  Senator Stevens 
was found guilty by a jury in 2008 for failing to reveal tens of thousands of dollars in gifts 
he received from an oil-services executive, but his conviction was later voided because of 
“prosecutorial missteps.”  See Editorial, The Ted Stevens Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, 
at A18 (denouncing the misconduct of the prosecutors who pursued Senator Stevens’s 
case); Posting of Susan Davis & Brent Kendall to Washington Wire, Jury Finds Sen. Ste-
vens Guilty of Failing to Report Gifts, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/10/27/jury-
finds-sen-stevens-guilty-of-failing-to-report-gifts (Oct. 27, 2008) (describing the conviction 
of Stevens for concealing gifts in violation of federal law).  Bob Ney pled guilty and was 
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many instances by K Street lobbyists.27  In addition, many have quickly 
attributed the current economic crisis, in part, to obscure and unregu-
lated hedge funds.28  Even prior to and independent of the financial 
crisis, hedge funds were the source of numerous securities fraud inves-
tigations and accusations.29  Legislative action has been swift in the face 
of these political controversies30 and the economic crisis.31  Simulta-
sentenced to thirty months in jail for his involvement with lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s cor-
rupt activities.  See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Ney Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison 
for Abramoff Deals, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007, at A3.  Then–House Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay resigned from his leadership position and declined to run for reelection in 2006 
after a grand jury indicted him for violating campaign finance laws and his former staffer 
pled guilty to conspiracy and corruption charges related to the Abramoff scandal.  See 
Jonathan Weisman & Chris Cillizza, DeLay to Resign from Congress, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 
2006, at A1.  Duke Cunningham pled guilty to taking $2.4 million in bribes, was sen-
tenced to eight years and four months in jail, and was ordered to pay $1.8 million in resti-
tution.  See Tony Perry, The Penalty Is Severe for Cunningham, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at 1, 
available at 2006 WLNR 6956166.   
27 Former lobbyist Jack Abramoff is currently serving jail time for his involvement 
in a major political scandal.  See Richard B. Schmitt, Ex–GOP Lobbyist Abramoff Sentenced 
to 4 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, at 23, available at 2008 WLNR 16823739.  
Abramoff pled guilty to defrauding American Indian tribes and corrupting public offi-
cials.  See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Abramoff Pleads Guilty to 3 Counts, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1 (summarizing the charges against Abramoff of “fraud, tax 
evasion, and conspiracy to bribe public officials”).  His testimony implicated members 
of Congress, Capitol Hill staff, and White House officials.  See id. (reporting the extent 
of the scandal, which involved Tom DeLay and Bob Ney).  Former Representative  
DeLay’s staffer and lobbyist Tony Rudy also pled guilty to conspiracy charges related to 
the Abramoff scandal.  See Philip Shenon, Ex–DeLay Aide Pleads Guilty in Lobby Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at A1. 
28 See, e.g., Hedge Funds and the Financial Market:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Government Reform of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman), available at http://oversight.house.gov/ 
images/stories/documents/20081113100820.pdf (examining the danger that hedge 
funds might pose to economic stability); see also Tom Hamburger, Financial System in 
Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 18977026 (reporting that 
Congress will certainly place blame for the financial crisis, in part, on hedge funds). 
29 See, e.g., Examining Enforcement of Criminal Insider Trading and Hedge Fund Activity:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1-3 (2006) (statement of Sen. 
Arlen Specter) (expressing concern over the frequency of insider trading in hedge 
funds); Greg N. Gregoriou & William Kelting, Hedge Fund Fraud (asserting that the lack 
of regulation of hedge funds coupled with hedge funds’ “performance-based remune-
ration structures” have led to increased speculation that hedge funds are participating 
in insider trading or other forms of securities fraud), in INSIDER TRADING 167, 168 
(Paul U. Ali & Greg N. Gregoriou eds., 2009).  
30 See, e.g., Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 & 18 U.S.C.) (re-
quiring heightened and more frequent disclosure of lobbying activities, lobbyists’ polit-
ical contributions, and member-supported earmarks in appropriations legislation). 
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neously, the Obama Administration stated an intention to “chang[e] 
the culture of Washington” by placing strict limits on lobbyists serving 
in government positions.32  As we move forward to consider the issues 
presented here, we must be careful to make informed decisions that are 
consistent with underlying law and public policy objectives and not to 
resort to demagoguery for the sake of political expediency. 
I.  TRADING ON POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
This Part considers the prevalence of trading on political informa-
tion by government insiders and outside actors to demonstrate that 
political intelligence can be very lucrative.  It then analyzes and reveals 
several deficiencies in current laws and ethics rules that attempt to 
curtail these activities.  First, there are no legal barriers preventing 
government insiders or outside actors from trading on political in-
formation.  Second, government insiders are not only able to trade on 
information acquired while on the job; they are also able to make leg-
islative decisions that will positively impact their existing portfolios.  
This fact reveals that political-intelligence trading by government in-
siders is part of a larger problem of political corruption, not merely 
insider trading.  Third, unlike lobbyists who seek to influence legisla-
tive policy, lobbyists hired to ferret out political intelligence are not 
required to publicly disclose those activities. 
A.  Government Insiders:  Elected Officials and Capitol Hill Staffers 
There is nothing new about politicians profiting on advance polit-
ical knowledge.  In fact, it is something of a tradition dating back to 
the Founding Fathers.  Following the ratification of the Constitution, 
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton persuaded Congress to re-
deem securities issued earlier by the federal government and the 
states.33  The securities were redeemed at face value, despite the fact 
that the market value of many securities had fallen to as low as ten 
31 See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 26 U.S.C.) (authorizing the 
Department of the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets). 
32 Dan Eggen, Lobbying Rules Keep Some Activists Out of Government, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 22, 2009, at A1 (quoting President Obama). 
33 See Sallie Gaines, Founding Fathers First Inside Traders, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 1987, at 
1, available at 1987 WLNR 1405587; see also Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen & Phi-
lip L. Hersch, Insider Trading:  The Law, the Theory, the Evidence, CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES, 
July 1988, at 1 (introducing the Founding Fathers’ “massive insider trading scheme” as 
background to the insider trading scandals of the 1980s). 
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percent of their initial worth.34  Aware of the redemption plan, many 
members of Congress bought up these securities in the market before 
news of the redemption plan became public.35 
Those who got wind of Hamilton’s plans made a killing in some cas-
es. . . . Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and other leaders of the new 
government were said to be unhappy about their cohorts’ activities.  But 
there was nothing the critics could do.  There was no Securities and Ex-
change Commission and no legal concept of insider trading.
36
 
Today, we have the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as 
well as an accepted—albeit confusing and ad hoc—concept of insider 
trading.  Would the current regime have satisfied Jefferson and Madi-
son by prosecuting profiteering politicians?  That question is ad-
dressed in the next Section.  This Section looks first to the prevalence 
of this American pastime.  It then analyzes current ethics laws to see if 
they police today’s government insiders any better than they would 
have policed our Founding Fathers. 
1.  Prevalence of Trading by Government Insiders 
Elected officials and their staff—government insiders—often have 
advance notice of key legislative, regulatory, or political decisions.  
“While investors spend time worrying how their stocks will do, mem-
bers of Congress often already know.”37  Government insiders are not 
simply aware of key decisions in advance but also are often directly in-
volved in making those decisions.  As one commentator has observed, 
Members of Congress are privy to information that affects the market.  
Few investors are better positioned to know when a new regulation is 
about to derail a booming business; when a young firm is set to win its 
first lucrative government contract; or whether a much-debated tax bill 
will actually become law.
38
 
The academic literature dealing with members’ market activities is 
relatively sparse.  Two studies are instructive.   
In the first study, Professor Gregory Boller from the University of 
Memphis analyzed financial disclosure reports (FDRs) of members of 
34 See Gaines, supra note 33. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Joy Ward, Taking Stock in Congress, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 16. 
38 Sheila Kaplan, Congress’s Insider Traders, NATION, July 6, 1998, at 5. 
2010] Cashing in on Capitol Hill 1463 
both houses of Congress.39  He found that twenty-five percent of 
members were investing in companies that faced ongoing legislative 
action.40  Although his research has been criticized because it only 
suggests a conflict,41 it provides strong anecdotal evidence indicating an 
informational advantage for government insiders.  Boller provides 
several examples, one of which is that of former Senator Al D’Amato 
of New York: 
On Oct. 22, 1992, D’Amato purchased between $8,000 and $120,000 
worth of stock in eight different public utilities.  Two days later, Presi-
dent Bush signed the National Energy Policy Act.  A part of the bill, 
which wasn’t publicized, deregulated energy transmissions, offering 
growth opportunities for many utilities.
42
 
Boller also provides the example of former Senator Lloyd Bentsen 
of Texas: 
On Feb. 22, 1991, then-Sen. Bentsen purchased stock (reported as be-
tween $1,000 and $15,000 in value) in food and dairy company Mor-
ningstar Foods.  Four days later, an amendment to the National School 
Lunch Act was introduced in the Senate to diversify milk choices for 
lunch programs.  On Dec. 23, 1991, Bentsen sold his stock.  Eight days 
later, Morningstar came under a Justice Department probe into bid-
rigging to sell milk in public schools.
43
 
This anecdote suggests that former Senator Bentsen knew not only 
when to purchase stock in a company that would benefit from legisla-
tion but also when to sell stock that would be detrimentally affected by 
a governmental investigation.  Consider one final example involving 
former Representative Newt Gingrich of Georgia: 
In January 1992, Gingrich bought between $1,000 and $15,000 worth of 
Boeing stock.  Three weeks later, when the House introduced the NASA 
Authorization Act, Gingrich helped kill amendments to cut funding for 




39 See Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd & Brigitte J. Ziobrowski, Ab-
normal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTIT-
ATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 662 (2004) (summarizing Professor Boller’s findings); Ward, supra 
note 37, at 16 (publishing Professor Boller’s results). 
40 Ward, supra note 37, at 16. 
41 See Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 662 (“However, this 
result merely suggests a potential conflict of interest.  His research did not demon-
strate that these investments yielded unusually large returns.”). 
42 Ward, supra note 37, at 16. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
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Former Representative Gingrich’s behavior suggests that not only do 
members trade on political information in advance of the informa-
tion’s public release but that members may also cast votes that directly 
benefit their financial portfolios.  This distinction is critical because, 
as this Comment points out, regulating politicians’ behavior under in-
sider trading will only, at most, curtail the former while leaving mem-
bers free to make decisions perfectly aware of how those decisions will 
benefit them financially. 
A separate review of financial disclosure reports in 1997 demonstrat-
ed that many lawmakers make no attempt to stay away from industries 
over which they would naturally appear to be conflicted because of their 
political authority or committee assignments.45  This demonstrates that 
public officials are not only well situated to access market-sensitive infor-
mation, they are also in a position to make market-sensitive decisions. 
The second study—by Alan Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James Boyd, 
and Brigitte Ziobrowski (Ziobrowski study)—takes Professor Boller’s 
insights one step further by demonstrating that congressional infor-
mational advantages translate into material economic benefits.  The 
Ziobrowski study looked for abnormal returns on the common stock 
portfolios held by U.S. Senators from 1993 to 1998.46  The objective of 
the research was to determine whether Senators’ investments outper-
formed the market, because such a showing would “support the no-
tion that Senators use their informational advantage for personal 
gain” and are “thereby using their unique position to increase their 
personal wealth.”47  Similar to the Boller study, the Ziobrowski study 
analyzed annual FDRs.48  Federal law requires that members of Con-
45 See Kaplan, supra note 38, at 5 (“An analysis by The Nation of Congressional dis-
closure reports for 1997, released in mid-June, shows that while some lawmakers avoid 
buying stock in industries that coincide with their key areas of legislative responsibili-
ty—or put their assets into blind trusts—many do not.”). 
46 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 661.  The Ziobrowksi 
et al. study has received a good deal of attention.  See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Regulation 
and Scholarship:  Constant Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 
309 (2008) (stating that the results “show that U.S. Senators are able to use their inside 
information about forthcoming government action to obtain significant positive ab-
normal returns on their equity investments”); Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 1-2 (sum-
marizing the study’s results); Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (citing the study). 
47 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 662. 
48 Id.  Though the published Ziobrowski study only considered the U.S. Senate, 
id., an unpublished study concerning the U.S. House of Representatives also found 
abnormal returns.  See Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ph.D., Robinson College of 
Business, Georgia State University), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/ 
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gress publicly disclose all common stock transactions in FDRs each 
year.49  The study scrutinized the sales and purchases of common 
stock—“trigger events”—during a six-year period from 1993 to 1998.50  
The results are staggering.  Portfolios that mirror the purchases of U.S. 
Senators outperformed the market51 by eighty-five basis points—nearly 
one percent—each month.52  Portfolios mimicking the sales of Sena-
tors underperformed the market53 by twelve basis points per month 
over the twelve months following the sale, meaning that the Senators 
in the study sold stocks that then went on to perform poorly relative to 
the market.54  Consequently, Senators beat the market by nearly twelve 
percent per year.55 
Further, the study also looked for cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs), which are the difference between the expected return of a 
hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ziobrowski_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Prevent-
ing Unfair Trading by Government Officials] (noting that the House study showing that 
returns on common stock investments by House members “beat the market” was never 
published because it “contain[ed] nothing new”). 
49 See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
50 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 662.  It is also signifi-
cant to note that the reporting of trigger events by the FDRs does not occur until five 
to seventeen months after the purchase or sale.  This is important because any “subse-
quent returns of these stocks could not have been market reactions to the actual trans-
actions themselves.”  Id.  The authors conclude that “[a]ny statistically significant ab-
normal returns therefore would likely be the result of reactions to events anticipated by 
Senators and motivated [by] their transactions.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The study was li-
mited to six years because FDRs are, by law, only retained for six years before being 
destroyed.  Id. at 669 n.3. 
51 “Outperforming” the market means that the stock or portfolio did better than 
the stock market overall. 
52 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 663.  This is using a ca-
lendar-time approach with the Fama-French three-factor model and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model.  For a thorough explanation of the data and research design, see id. at 
663-66.  Portfolios mirroring common stock investments by members of the House of 
Representatives outperformed the market by approximately one-half of one percent per 
month, or six percent annually, from 1985 to 2001.  Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading 
by Government Officials, supra note 48, at 3 (proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski). 
53 “Underperforming” the market means that the stock or portfolio did worse 
than the stock market overall. 
54 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 663. 
55 See Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48, at 3 
(proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski) (“Common stock investments made by 
Senators beat the market by approximately 1% per month or 12% per year from 1993 
to 1998.”); Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 675 (finding that, 
when combining buy and sell transactions in a hedged portfolio, “Senators outperform 
the market by 97 basis points (nearly 1%) per month on a trade-weighted basis”). 
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particular stock and the actual return of that stock.56  The CARs of 
stocks purchased by U.S. Senators were “near zero” over the calendar 
year prior to being purchased.57  CARs increased to more than twenty-
five percent over the twelve months following the purchase of the 
stock by a U.S. Senator, meaning that these stocks exceeded expecta-
tions.58  Abnormal returns on common stocks sold by U.S. Senators 
were “near zero” over the twelve months after being sold but had been 
twenty-five percent positive over the twelve months prior to being 
sold.59  The point of sale usually represented a peak in abnormal re-
turn value.60  “These results suggest that Senators knew appropriate 
times to both buy and sell their common stocks.”61 
Senators’ exceptional returns are economically significant.  By way 
of example, common stock returns for randomly selected households 
over a similar period—1991 to 1996—found that the average household 
underperformed the market by nearly twelve basis points.62  One could 
easily argue that U.S. Senators are not average U.S. households.  At the 
very least, they are savvy enough to get themselves elected to high pub-
lic office.  Politicians are often well educated and have access to social 
networks that may provide informational advantages apart from those 
that they encounter while performing official duties. 
Another study found, however, that corporate insiders who traded 
in their respective companies earned abnormal returns ranging from 
approximately fifty to approximately seventy basis points each 
month,63 or six percent on an annual basis.64  While still significant, 
56 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 360 (9th ed. 2008) (providing a formula to show that abnormal 
return is the difference between the actual return on a security and the expected re-
turn on the security).  Accordingly, a “cumulative daily abnormal return” is simply the 
total daily abnormal return over a defined period of time for a specific security. 
57 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 675. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 663. 
61 Id. at 675. 
62 Id. at 669 (citing Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your 
Wealth:  The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000)). 
63 See Leslie A. Jeng, Andrew Metrick & Richard Zeckhauser, Estimating the Returns 
to Insider Trading:  A Performance-Evaluation Perspective, 85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 453, 467 
(2003) (looking at trading in company common stock during the period of 1975 to 
1996 and concluding that “abnormal returns to a value-weighted portfolio of all insider 
purchases—holding positions for 6 months—are between 52 and 68 basis points per 
month, an economically and statistically significant magnitude”). 
64 See id. at 456 (“Purchases . . . are followed by a positive CAR of about 6% over 
the subsequent 100 days.”). 
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the average abnormal returns of corporate insiders are only a fraction 
(approximately one-fourth) of U.S. Senators’ abnormal returns.65  
Corporate insiders should be the most savvy, educated, and networked 
investors, especially when investing in their own companies.  Never-
theless, policymakers outperform corporate insiders, suggesting an in-
formational advantage above and beyond mere talent and skill. 
These studies provide compelling evidence that government insiders 
possess a material informational advantage when investing in the market.  
The Ziobrowski study concludes that, although the exact source and na-
ture of market information are not known, “Senators have demonstrated 
a definite informational advantage over other investors.”66 
2.  Current Laws and Ethics Rules Affecting Government  
Insiders’ Trading Practices 
The Code of Ethics for Government Service (Code of Ethics) pro-
vides broad ethical guidelines for “all Government employees, includ-
ing officeholders.”67  It was passed as a concurrent resolution by Con-
gress in 1958 and provides, in relevant part, that government employees 
should “[n]ever use any information coming to [them] confidentially 
in the performance of governmental duties as a means for making pri-
vate profit.”68  Though the concurrent resolution is not a legally binding 
statute, the House of Representatives has incorporated it into the House 
Ethics Manual.69  Consequently, covered individuals who violate the 
Code of Ethics can face formal charges.70  The Senate Ethics Manual, 
65 The CARs for U.S. Senators were twenty-five percent.  See supra note 58 and  
accompanying text. 
66 Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 676.  Ziobrowski, 
Cheng, Boyd, and Ziobrowski conclude by recommending further investigation.  Id.  
They suggest examining the “financial transactions of members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, high-ranking officials of the Federal executive branch, and Federal 
judges.”  Id. 
67 Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 
Stat. B12 (1958). 
68 Id. 
69 H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., HOUSE ETHICS 
MANUAL 20, 249 (2008) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL], available at http:// 
ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf; see also Javers, supra 
note 1, at 42 (“But ethics experts say no one’s breaking the rules.  Hill staffers and gov-
ernment employees are forbidden from personally profiting from confidential data 
and can’t share information that’s classified or deemed secret by their employers.”). 
70 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 20.  In at least one instance the House 
“reprimanded” a member who took official action that increased his personal finances.  
Id. at 20-21 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1364, at 3 (1976)).   
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however, does not explicitly incorporate the Code of Ethics but rather 
lists it as a source of jurisdiction for the Senate Ethics Committee.71 
In addition to incorporating the Code of Ethics, the House Ethics 
Manual prohibits “all Members, officers, and employees”—known as 
“covered” individuals—from “improperly using their official positions 
for personal gain.”72  Nonetheless, it does not require covered individ-
uals to “divest themselves of assets” upon taking up a covered posi-
tion.73  Furthermore, members are not required to “disqualify them-
selves from voting on issues that generally affect their personal 
financial interests.”74  Rather, the House of Representatives sets forth 
broad financial disclosure requirements as “a means of monitoring 
and deterring conflicts.”75 
Unlike the House ethics rules, neither the Senate Ethics Manual 
nor the Senate Code of Conduct provide language prohibiting Sena-
tors from using information acquired while performing official duties 
for personal profit.76  Like the House version, the Senate Ethics Manual 
provides that “[a] Member or employee should never use the prestige 
or influence of a position in the Senate for personal gain.”77  However, 
like the House rules, the Senate rules provide sweeping language that 
enables Senators to maintain market positions that potentially conflict 
with official duties; members are not required to divest themselves of 
assets, even where there are conflicts of interest.  The Senate Ethics 
Manual explains that 
[u]nlike many officials in the executive branch, who are concerned with 
administration and regulation in a narrow area, a Senator exercises 
judgment concerning legislation across the entire spectrum of business 
and economic endeavors.  The wisdom of complete (unlike selective) di-
71 Cf. S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 7-8 
(2003) [hereinafter SENATE ETHICS MANUAL], available at http://ethics.senate.gov/ 
downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf. 
72 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 247. 
73 Id.; see also Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?:  An An-
swer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 89 (“Members of Congress are not 
required to divest their financial holdings or put them in a blind trust.  As a result, 
members of Congress sometimes play key roles in passing or blocking legislation that 
has a direct impact on their investments.”). 
74 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 247. 
75 Id. 
76 See S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 110TH CONG., AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENATE 
CODE OF CONDUCT AND RELATED LAWS (2007), available at http://ethics.senate.gov/ 
downloads/pdffiles/overview.pdf; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71.  A search of 
both documents reveals no prohibitive language. 
77 SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 65. 
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vestiture may also be questioned as likely to insulate a legislator from the 
personal and economic interests that his or her constituency, or society 
in general, has in governmental decisions and policy.
78
 
The House Ethics Manual provides similar reasoning.79 
In contrast, Senate committee staff who earn over $25,000 per 
year are required to “divest themselves of any substantial holdings 
which may be directly affected by the actions of the employing com-
mittee.”80  Apart from the committee-staff exception, Senators and 
employees of individual Senators are not required to divest themselves 
of assets upon assuming their positions.81  Additionally, as in the 
House, Senators are not required to “disqualify themselves from vot-
ing on issues that generally affect their personal financial interests.”82 
Rather, the Senate and the House view financial disclosure as supe-
rior to divestiture.83  Public disclosure is seen as the best way to monitor 
political conflicts of interest and enable constituencies to judge the fi-
nancial activity of their elected officials.84  To that end, House and Se-
nate disclosure rules require that all members, officers, and certain em-
78 Id. at 124.  The same language is provided in the HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra 
note 69, at 250. 
79 As the House Ethics Manual states, 
Proposals for divestiture of potentially conflicting assets and mandatory disquali-
fication of Members from voting were rejected as impractical or unreasonable.  
Such disqualification could result in the disenfranchisement of a Member’s en-
tire constituency on particular issues.  A Member may often have a community 
of interests with the Member’s constituency, and may arguably have been 
elected because of and to serve these common interests, and thus would be inef-
fective in representing the real interests of the constituents if the Member was 
disqualified from voting on issues touching those matters of mutual concern. 
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 249-50 (footnotes omitted). 
80 SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 70.  Oddly, this divestiture require-
ment does not apply to the Senate committee members themselves. 
81 Id. at 124. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. (“The drafters of the original Senate Code of Official Conduct, in the 95th 
Congress, considered ‘full and complete public financial disclosure’ to be ‘the heart of 
the code of conduct.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-49, at 3 (1977))); see also HOUSE ETHICS 
MANUAL, supra note 69, at 249 (“Financial disclosure provisions were enacted to monitor 
and to deter possible conflicts of interest due to outside financial holdings.”); H.R. DOC. 
NO. 95-73, at 9-10 (1977) (“In the case of investment income, then, the Commission’s 
belief is that potential conflicts of interest are best deterred through disclosure and the 
discipline of the electoral process.  Other approaches are flawed both in terms of their 
reasonableness and practicality, and threaten to impair, rather than to protect, the rela-
tionship between the representative and the represented.”). 
84 See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 251; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL,  
supra note 71, at 124-25. 
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ployees make available “financial information concerning themselves, 
their spouses, and dependent children.”85  Congress condensed and 
consolidated the financial disclosure requirements for federal govern-
ment officials into the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.86  FDRs are 
required to contain information on “outside compensation, holdings, 
transactions, liabilities, positions held and gifts received.”87  The idea is 
that once FDRs are made available, the public will police investment 
behavior where it conflicts with legislative responsibilities. 
Congress has decisively chosen disclosure over abstention or dives-
titure.  The Code of Ethics is merely a concurrent resolution without 
force of law.  Though the House has incorporated the Code of Ethics 
and the Senate cites it as authority, critics note that it is blatantly un-
enforced.88  At most, only a handful of members have been repri-
manded, and neither the House nor the Senate requires members to 
divest themselves of assets over which they have legislative jurisdiction 
or to recuse themselves from voting at any time in ways that affect 
their financial portfolios.  This fact demonstrates that political-
intelligence trading is merely part of a larger problem of financial 
conflicts of interest and political corruption, not just insider trading. 
85 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 247; accord SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, 
supra note 71, at 124-25, 127.  “Certain employees” refers to senior employees who 
meet certain salary thresholds.  SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 125-26. 
86 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5 
& 28 U.S.C.).  The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 then codified legislative branch disclosure 
requirements.  Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 2, 5, 10, 18, 26 & 31 U.S.C.).  Recourse for failure to comply with the FDR re-
quirement is limited to committee action and civil penalties.  In addition to official Se-
nate or House committee action for failure to comply with the FDR requirement, the 
Attorney General can seek civil penalties from those who knowingly and willfully falsify or 
fail to file required information.  5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 104(a) (2006); see also HOUSE ETHICS 
MANUAL, supra note 69, at 265; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 127. 
87 SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 125; accord HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, 
supra note 69, at 252. 
88 See Posting of Rep. Louise Slaughter to Daily Kos, Follow-Up on Our Bill to Stop 
Insider Trading in DeLay’s House (Congress), http://www.dailykos.com/story/ 
2006/4/5/164552/0893 (Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Slaughter Follow-Up] (“[The 
Code of Ethics clause] has never really been enforced, and it has not been adopted by 
the Senate.  Furthermore, it is part of the House Ethics Rules—it is not law, so the 
practice is not illegal.  In addition, the House ethics rule has absolutely no impact on 
the sharing of this information with outside political intelligence firms for trading de-
cisions.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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B.  Outside Actors:  K Street Lobbyists and Wall Street Funds 
While government insiders directly encounter or create market-
sensitive information during the performance of official duties, out-
side actors actively engage in mining such information.  In Washing-
ton, the practice has become quite lucrative.89  And for the investing 
clientele, purchasing political intelligence is paying off.  As one Wash-
ington firm advertised, 
While Congress negotiated significant pension reform legislation behind 
closed doors, our clients relied on our political intelligence gathering to in-




1.  The Rise of Political-Intelligence Gathering 
The practice of gathering and selling political information prior 
to its public release is nothing new.  Investors realize that “[t]he invis-
ible hand of the market sometimes takes cues from the long arm of 
Washington.”91  The industry started with a few firms in the 1970s and 
has taken off in recent years due to the “explosion of hedge funds,” a 
new clientele with deeper pockets.92  One Washington insider predicts 
that lobbying shops collectively generate $30 to $40 million in fees 
from their political-intelligence practices annually.93  A Capitol Hill 
staffer reported that her legislator’s office receives almost as many 
phone calls asking about the status of legislation as they do seeking to 
influence legislation.94 
Who are these firms?  And who are their high-paying clients?  Lit-
tle is known about who exactly the players are.  This is because lobby-
ing firms are not required to publicly disclose their political-
89 See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing Elliott Portnoy and attribut-
ing his being named chairman of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP in part to his 
success at cultivating a successful political-intelligence unit). 
90 Pub. Law & Policy Strategies Group, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, In-
formation Capital & Political Intelligence (emphasis added) (on file with author).  
This sentence captures perfectly what “material nonpublic information” means in the 
insider trading context.  “Behind closed doors” essentially means nonpublic, and “af-
fect their investments” signifies information that is material. 
91 Snyder, supra note 9. 
92 Javers, supra note 1, at 42. 
93 Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Elliott Portnoy of Sonnenschein 
Nath & Rosenthal LLP, who hinted that the firm’s annual revenue from political-
intelligence gathering was between $1 million and $5 million). 
94 See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing a congressional staffer, who 
stated that “[t]he amount of insider trading going on in these halls is incredible”). 
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intelligence clients.95  Traditional clients hire lobbyists to peddle in-
fluence on their behalf and accordingly are made public through the 
disclosure requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA).96  Po-
litical-intelligence clients, on the other hand, do not actively influence 
legislation.  They do not send information or opinions to Capitol Hill 
with the objective of affecting outcomes.  Rather, political-intelligence 
clients receive information.  They do not speak but listen.  As defined 
by the LDA, these activities do not constitute “lobbying.”97 
What is known about this practice comes from media reports and 
lobbying firms’ promotional materials.  It is generally believed that the 
primary clients of political-intelligence groups are hedge funds.98  
Hedge funds “pursue high-risk, high-yield investments for wealthy 
clients.”99  Political intelligence is seen as more valuable to these funds 
since they tend to hold assets over a shorter amount of time; mutual 
funds, on the other hand, hold diversified portfolios over longer pe-
riods of time and do not have a similar potential to gain from placing 
bets on the political winds of Washington.100  “What sets hedge funds 
apart is their ability to act instantly on news and to employ trading op-
tions that allow them to make money whether stocks rise or fall.”101  
This includes short selling, in which hedge funds borrow securities 
and then sell the borrowed securities into the market with the expec-
tation that they will buy them back when the price drops.102  Mutual 
funds, on the other hand, are usually entrusted with retirement funds 
95 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
96 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2009). 
97 See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. 
98 See Jeffrey Young, K Street Grows, Maybe Even Beyond Disclosure, HILL, Feb. 25, 
2008, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/3475-k-street-grows-maybe-even-beyond-
disclosure (interviewing Rich Gold, head of the lobbying group at Holland & Knight, 
who said that political intelligence has grown rapidly in the past five years because of 
the “uptick in hedge fund issues”). 
99 Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17. 
100 See Jim Snyder, Transparency Sought on ‘Political Intel,’ HILL, Apr. 4, 2006, at 6, 
available at LEXIS.  The logic that short-term investors, such as hedge funds, benefit 
most from political intelligence is consistent with arguments that these investors are 
likewise the greatest beneficiaries of other informational advantages apart from politi-
cal intelligence.  See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING 13 (1991) (arguing that 
informational advantages benefit sizable investors who “trade frequently enough to 
reap the trading profits generated by that advice,” as opposed to small investors who, if 
rational, follow long-term “buy-and-hold strategies”). 
101 Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17. 
102 Id. 
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and do not, or cannot, employ such practices because of substantive 
SEC regulations that prohibit mutual funds from doing so.103 
A number of Washington firms have advertised their political-
intelligence practices directly or have spoken with the media.  Many 
firms involved in the practice can be identified through these commu-
nications, including Patton Boggs LLP,104 Sonnenschein Nath & Rosen-
thal LLP,105 Washington Analysis,106 PodestaMattoon,107 Cormac 
Group,108 Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc.,109 Bryan Cave Strategies 
LLC,110 DLA Piper,111 Williams & Jensen,112 and Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld LLP.113  Hedge funds, by contrast, generally do not want 
to discuss their political-intelligence activities.114  From various inter-
103 See id.; Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22-24, on file with author) (“The ICA also 
imposes substantive regulation on mutual funds.  Funds are restricted in their use of 
leverage.  This limitation extends to short selling, which the SEC views as borrowing.  
Funds are limited to holding a maximum of fifteen percent of their portfolios in illiqu-
id assets and are also regulated in their use of options and other derivative products.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
104 See Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17 (interviewing former U.S. Senator 
John Breaux, who represents the hedge fund Clinton Group Inc. on behalf of Patton 
Boggs LLP). 
105 See Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Elliott Portnoy of Sonnenschein Nath & 
Rosenthal LLP, who reports having numerous political-intelligence clients). 
106 See Javers, supra note 1, at 42 (interviewing Leslie Alperstein, a founder of 
Washington Analysis, and reporting that the firm was sold in July 2005 “to China’s 
Xinhua Finance, which is 6.5%-owned by the government-controlled Xinhua News 
Agency”); see also Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Tim VandenBerg, a senior policy 
analyst at Washington Analysis). 
107 See Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17 (interviewing Tony Podesta—
brother of John Podesta, former chief of staff to President Clinton—whose firm, Po-
destaMattoon, was retained by an unnamed hedge fund). 
108 See id. (interviewing Jonathan Slade, lobbyist for Cormac Group, who reported 
representing hedge fund GoldenTree Asset Management LP). 
109 See id. (interviewing Alex Vogel, cofounder of Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc.). 
110 See id. (interviewing Steve Elmendorf, whose firm, Bryan Cave Strategies LLC, 
represents a hedge fund). 
111 See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing Matthew Bernstein of DLA 
Piper, who estimated that its “political-intelligence business has quadrupled in size” in 
the three years between 2003 and 2006). 
112 See Young, supra note 98 (interviewing Williams & Jensen Chairman and CEO J. 
Steven Hart, who stated that the firm’s decline in reported lobbying revenue reflects 
an increase in unreported political-intelligence work). 
113 See Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Joel Jankowsky of Akin Gump Strauss Hau-
er & Feld LLP, who reported that the firm “does some political-intelligence work”). 
114 See Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17 (“[H]edge funds aren’t interested 
in talking about [their political intelligence activities]:  Companies among the 25 big-
gest funds . . . declined to comment for this story.”). 
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views, however, one can discern that hedge fund players include Clin-
ton Group, Inc.,115 GoldenTree Asset Management LP,116 and Carlson 
Capital, L.P.117 
Lobbying firms are not shy about their ability to mine little-known 
political information—this skill is precisely the product that they 
hawk.118  Firms claim the capability to farm numerous substantive areas 
for political intelligence, including climate control legislation, asbes-
tos reform, tariff decisions, energy policy, the federal budget (includ-
ing funding for health care, defense, and research), tax policy and 
credits, and patent legislation.119  What is critical is not merely receiv-
ing information but receiving it before it is widely known.  As one lob-
byist bragged, “We provide customized political intelligence and de-
liver the information ahead of the news cycle.”120  K Street is able to 
access much of this information through political connections and 
networks.  Many of the lobbyists who have spoken with the press had 
previously worked on Capitol Hill or in various administrations.  
Again, firms are not shy about this fact.121 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing Clint Carlson, who runs a 
$3 billion hedge fund, Carlson Capital, L.P., that hires Washington lawyers to pro-
vide political intelligence). 
118 For example, one firm advertises that 
[t]hrough our pioneering Information Capital & Political Intelligence Prac-
tice, our team provides insight, analysis, and evaluation that separates rhetoric 
from reality . . . for [those] involved in the public and private equity markets.   
By knowing the legislative and political “pulse” in the nation’s capital and in 
statehouses throughout the country, we present clients with valuable, in-
sightful information so they can make prudent decisions in advance of the 
traditional news cycle. 
Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Core Competen-
cies:  Information Capital & Political Intelligence, http://www.sonnenschein.com/ 
practice_areas/plps/corecomps/cc3/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
119 See Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, supra 
note 15. 
120 Snyder, supra note 9 (quoting Elliott Portnoy of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosen-
thal LLP). 
121 See, e.g., Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, 
supra note 15 (“[O]ur considerable network of federal and state political experts and 
relationships with key elected officials[] afford us a unique ability to decipher reality 
from rhetoric.”). 
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2.  Current Laws Affecting Political-Intelligence Gathering 
The LDA requires individuals to publicly disclose the clients on 
whose behalf they lobby in quarterly reports filed with the Secretary of 
the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives.122  Reports must 
include, in addition to other information, the name of the client, lob-
bying firm, and lobbyist; lists of activities, employees, and interests of 
foreign entities for each general substantive issue lobbied; and the 
approximate income received from the client (rounded to the nearest 
$10,000 if in excess of $5000).123 
An individual is required to register and report within forty-five 
days after she has made a lobbying contact or has been hired to make 
a lobbying contact.124  A “lobbying contact” is defined as an oral or 
written communication to a covered executive or legislative branch 
official that concerns (1) “the formulation, modification, or adoption” 
of federal legislation, rules, regulations, executive orders, programs, 
policies, or positions; (2) “the administration or execution” of federal 
policies or programs; or (3) “the nomination or confirmation” of an 
individual subject to Senate confirmation.125 
Although an inquiry made on behalf of political-intelligence 
clients pertains to the “formulation, modification, or adoption” of leg-
islation, it is exempt as an “administrative request.”126  Since political-
intelligence gatherers are not actively seeking to “influence” legisla-
tion, the LDA does not apply.127  No other laws appear to specifically 
regulate political-intelligence activities. 
122 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2009). 
123 Id. § 1604(b)–(c). 
124 Id. § 1603(a)(1).  The definition of “lobbyist” exempts individuals “whose lob-
bying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services pro-
vided by such individual to that client over a 3-month period.”  Id. § 1602(10). 
125 Id. § 1602(8)(A). 
126 See id. § 1602(8)(B)(v) (exempting “a request for a meeting, a request for the 
status of an action, or any other similar administrative request, if the request does not 
include an attempt to influence a covered executive branch official or a covered legis-
lative branch official”); SENATE OFFICE OF PUB. RECORDS & LEGISLATIVE RES. CTR., 
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT GUIDANCE 7 (2009) [hereinafter LDA GUIDANCE], available 
at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/resources/pdf/S1guidance.pdf (“If a communi-
cation is limited to routine information-gathering questions and there is not an at-
tempt to influence a covered official, the exception of Section 3(8)(B)(v) for ‘any oth-
er similar administrative request’ would normally apply.”); see also Snyder, supra note 9 
(“Because they aren’t, in fact, lobbying for these clients, firms don’t have to register 
with the Senate or the House.”). 
127 See LDA GUIDANCE, supra note 126, at 7. 
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II.  ANALYSIS UNDER THE CURRENT FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
The previous Part concluded that ethics laws do not adequately 
prohibit government insiders or outside actors from trading on ma-
terial nonpublic political information.  This Part considers whether 
the current federal securities laws cover these trading activities.  This 
question is important because inside traders face criminal punishment 
and significant civil sanctions.128  For government insiders, this pros-
pect is certainly much more severe than breaching Congressional eth-
ics rules, which in the Senate do not cover trading on inside informa-
tion and in the House are unenforced.129  Even still, breaches of ethics 
laws typically provide only for remedial action (reprimand or, at most, 
removal) and nominal civil fines.130  For outside actors—who are not 
precluded from trading on political intelligence under any other laws 
and are not even required to disclose these activities—insider trading 
liability would certainly be a deal breaker. 
A.  Current Law and Doctrine 
Insider trading is commonly defined as “the purchase or sale of 
securities on the basis of material non-public information.”131  Modern 
128 Those convicted of insider trading face fines of up to $5 million and prison 
sentences of up to twenty years, but “no person shall be subject to imprison-
ment . . . for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no know-
ledge of such rule or regulation.”  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78ff(a) (2006).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increased maximum fines from $1 
million and maximum prison sentences from ten years.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 1106, 
§ 32(a), 116 Stat. 745, 810. 
129 See supra subsection I.A.2. 
130 See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 3 (describing penalties for viola-
tions of House ethics rules as including “censure, reprimand, condemnation, reduc-
tion of seniority, fine, or other sanction determined to be appropriate,” and noting 
that in some situations, where the ethics rules “derive from criminal law,” such viola-
tions “may lead to a fine or imprisonment, or both”); SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra 
note 71, at 4 (“Upon completion of its investigative process, the Committee may rec-
ommend . . . an appropriate sanction for a violation or improper conduct, including, 
for Senators, censure, expulsion, or party discipline and, for staff members, termina-
tion of employment.”).  In practice, expulsion and censure have been the most serious 
punishments imposed upon members violating ethical responsibilities.  See CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT 6 
(2008) (reviewing various expulsion and censure cases and describing expulsion as the 
“most serious punishment”). 
131 C. EDWARD FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 3 (1991) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also NASSER ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING 1 (1993) (“We define insider 
trading as transactions in the shares of publicly held corporations using material non-
public information.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider 
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federal insider trading law is statutorily rooted in section 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).132  Yet, nothing 
in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act explicitly mentions insider trad-
ing.  Rather, section 10(b) was considered “a catchall intended to cap-
ture various types of securities fraud not expressly covered by more 
specific provisions of the Exchange Act.”133  Congress intended for sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act134 to be the statutory basis for preventing 
insider trading, whereas “section 10 . . . was not thought by Congress 
in 1934 to be an anti-insider trading section.”135 
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942 pursuant to section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act.136  Like the Exchange Act, the Rule does 
Trading:  A Comprehensive Primer 3 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=261277 (“Generally speaking, insider trading is trading in 
securities while in possession of material nonpublic information.”). 
132 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  The relevant portion of section 10 provides that 
 [i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange— 
 . . . . 
 (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id. 
133 Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 10. 
134 Section 16 of the Exchange Act is a categorical prohibition on short-swing trad-
ing by corporate insiders.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  It provides that each officer, director, 
or ten-percent beneficial owner of a corporate security covered by the Exchange Act 
must file certain disclosures with the SEC and is precluded from realizing profit, which 
“inures” to the issuer, on the sale of any corporate security within six months of its 
purchase.  Id. § 78p(a)–(b); see also Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 10-11. 
135 FLETCHER, supra note 131, at 45. 
136 See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 11.  The Rule provides as follows: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange, 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
 in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
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not mention insider trading.  It was not until 1961 that the SEC found 
insider trading on an impersonal stock exchange to violate Rule 10b-
5,137 and “[o]nly then did the modern federal insider trading prohibi-
tion at last begin to take shape.”138  Despite section 10(b)’s inauspi-
cious statutory roots, judicial interpretation and SEC application have 
expanded section 10(b) into the broad antifraud provision that it is 
today, notwithstanding some judicial and administrative decisions that 
have narrowed its application.139 
Several insider trading theories have been recognized under sec-
tion 10(b).  These include (1) classic insider trading liability, under 
which an insider breaches a fiduciary duty that she directly owes to the 
corporation and its shareholders; (2) tipper/tippee liability, under 
which a tippee trades on information gained from a fiduciary tipper 
and inherits the tipper’s fiduciary duty; and (3) misappropriation lia-
bility, under which an individual trades on information in violation of 
a fiduciary duty or a duty of trust or confidence owed to the source of 
the information. 
The SEC has provided its interpretation of these three theories in 
Rule 10b5-1, which provides that 
[t]he “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) 
of the Act [and Rule 10b-5] . . . include, among other things, the pur-
chase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic 
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confi-
dence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security 
or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of 
the material nonpublic information.
140
 
The rest of this Section briefly discusses each basis of liability and then 
applies each in the context of trading on political intelligence. 
137 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908-09, 911 (1961) (holding that a bro-
ker who obtained nonpublic information about a company’s dividend action and who 
entered sale orders before the information became public had violated Rule 10b-5). 
138 Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 12. 
139 See FLETCHER, supra note 131, at 99 (describing the evolution of Rule 10b-5 ju-
risprudence).  Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist opined that Rule 10b-5 
is “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”  Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
140 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (emphasis added).  The regulation, however, specifi-
cally notes that “[t]he law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions 
construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading 
law in any other respect.”  Id. preliminary note. 
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1.  Classic Insider Trading:  The Disclose-or-Abstain Rule 
The classic case of insider trading occurs when a corporate insider 
buys or sells shares of her company while possessing material nonpublic 
information acquired through her corporate insider position.  Original-
ly, the concept was applied broadly and required anyone with “access, 
directly or indirectly,”141 to material nonpublic information to “disclose 
or abstain” from trading using the information.142  It was not long, how-
ever, before the Supreme Court cabined the disclose-or-abstain rule by 
limiting it to corporate fiduciaries who possess material nonpublic in-
formation.  A duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises only where 
there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties involved, namely, 
the individual trader and the issuer of the security.143  Rule 10b-5 does 
141 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
142 The SEC established the disclose-or-abstain rule in Cady, Roberts:  
We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material 
facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their 
investment judgment.  Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances consti-
tutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions.  If, on the other hand, disclosure 
prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the 
circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction. 
Id. at 911 (footnote omitted). 
 The first “truly seminal insider trading case[]” was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
decided by the Second Circuit in 1968.  See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 13 (com-
menting on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)).  
Texas Gulf Sulphur involved corporate insiders who bought stock or call options in the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS) from the fall of 1963 through the spring of 1964.  
401 F.2d at 839.  During this time, TGS exploration teams discovered substantial zinc 
and copper deposits under a parcel of land, the rights to which TGS eventually pur-
chased.  Id. at 843-44.  TGS denied rumors of the discovery until eventually announc-
ing the find in April 1964, id. at 844-45, and by May, TGS stock was trading at prices 
222% above its share price several months earlier, Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 13.  
The Second Circuit upheld the convictions of certain TGS insiders under Rule 10b-5, 
401 F.2d at 852, reasoning that insiders who possess material nonpublic information 
must disclose the information or abstain from trading altogether, id. at 848.   
143 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (holding that “the ele-
ment required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose—[was] absent in this 
case” because the petitioner “was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sel-
lers had placed their trust and confidence”).  In Chiarella, Vincent Chiarella, an em-
ployee of a financial printer, learned of an upcoming tender offer while preparing the 
tender offer materials.  Id. at 224.  Chiarella purchased shares in the target company 
and later sold them for a substantial profit.  Id.  He was convicted of violating Rule 10b-
5.  Id. at 222.  The Second Circuit applied Texas Gulf Sulphur to uphold his conviction, 
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), but the Supreme Court 
reversed, 445 U.S. at 231-35, 237.  See also ARSHADI & EYSSELL, supra note 131, at 52 
(“This ruling required that to impose the disclose or abstain rule, the trader must be a 
fiduciary to the firm and consequently to its shareholders.”). 
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not create liability for nondisclosure “absent a duty to speak.”144  Accor-
dingly, a cognizable insider trading claim under the classic theory can 
be sustained only if the defendant trades on material nonpublic infor-
mation in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the security’s issuer. 
2.  Tipper/Tippee Liability 
Courts have extended Rule 10b-5 to provide liability for an indi-
vidual who is not a fiduciary but who trades on a tip from an individu-
al who is a fiduciary.  In this situation, the “tippee” inherits the fidu-
ciary duty of the “tipper” when the tipper has received a personal 
benefit from passing on the tip.145  This is because a tippee assumes 
the liability of the tipper by participating in the “insider’s breach of a 
fiduciary duty.”146  The tippee’s liability is “derivative.”147  Accordingly, 
a tippee is “liable only when the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by 
disclosing information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or has rea-
son to know of the breach of duty.”148  Further, the duty is inheritable 
only when the tipper received a gift, pecuniary gain, or reputational 
enhancement.149  The term “reputational enhancement” is broad and 
can include merely a “warm glow” from helping a friend.150 
144 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. 
145 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1983) (“In determining whether a tip-
pee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine 
whether the insider’s ‘tip’ constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary du-
ty. . . . [T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit . . . from his disclo-
sure.”).  Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst who, on the tip of a former officer 
of Equity Funding of America, uncovered substantial fraud at the company.  Id. at 648-
49.  Dirks shared his discovery with the Wall Street Journal and his clients.  Id. at 649-50.  
Some of Dirks’s clients sold their holdings in Equity Funding and avoided substantial 
losses that would have occurred if they had held their securities until the news became 
public.  Id. at 649.  The Court held that Dirks did not violate Rule 10b-5 because the 
corporate insiders did not share information with Dirks for the purpose of gaining a 
personal advantage.  Id. at 662, 665, 667.  Consequently, the Court overturned Dirks’s 
conviction.  Id. at 667. 
146 Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12). 
147 Id. 
148 Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 19; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (“Thus, a tippee 
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material 
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or 
should know that there has been a breach.”). 
149 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (noting that the determination of whether “there has 
been a breach of duty by the insider . . . requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e., 
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, 
such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earn-
ings. . . . The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also 
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3.  Misappropriation Theory 
The misappropriation theory was developed to fill a void created 
by the fiduciary requirement imputed to the classic insider trading 
theory, and it has been used to reach outsider trading.151  The Su-
preme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in 1997.152  The 
theory creates insider trading liability for outsiders who trade on ma-
terial nonpublic information in breach of a “duty of trust or confi-
dence” owed to the inside source of the information.153  In essence, 
even if a trader does not owe a duty to the issuer of the security in 
which he trades, he may still be liable if he is in a position of confi-
dence with the information’s source. 
The SEC’s interpretation of the misappropriation theory is pro-
vided in Rule 10b5-2.154  The Rule applies to any violation under the 
Act or Rule 10b-5 “that is based on the purchase or sale of securities 
on the basis of, or the communication of, material nonpublic infor-
mation misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.”155  Rule 
10b5-2 provides that a “duty of trust or confidence” will be inferred 
exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.” (citation omitted)); Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 19 (explaining that “nonpe-
cuniary gain,” such as a boost to one’s reputation, could create a personal benefit). 
150 See ARSHADI & EYSSELL, supra note 131, at 53. 
151 The SEC pushed the misappropriation theory following setbacks in Chiarella 
and Dirks, decisions that were seen as having too greatly limited SEC authority to effec-
tively curb insider trading.  Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 22. 
152 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997).  James O’Hagan was a 
partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, which had been hired by Grand Metro-
politan PLC with respect to a planned tender offer for shares of the Pillsbury Compa-
ny.  Id. at 647.  O’Hagan, who was not working on the deal but knew of its details, pur-
chased stock and call options in the target company, Pillsbury.  Id.  Following the 
announcement of the tender offer, O’Hagan sold his shares and options, reaping a 
“profit of more than $4.3 million.”  Id. at 648.  O’Hagan was not subject to liability un-
der the classic insider trading theory because his firm was employed by the bidder, and 
O’Hagan took positions in the target.  Id. at 653 n.5.  The Court recognized that 
O’Hagan owed no duty to the target company in which he traded, yet “it grounded 
liability under the misappropriation theory on deception of the source of the informa-
tion.”  Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 30.  O’Hagan, a fiduciary of his law firm, failed to 
disclose his use of information that belonged to the firm.  Cf. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 
n.6.  O’Hagan’s conduct, as a result, was sufficient to constitute a violation of Rule 10b-
5.  Id. at 666. 
153 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653; see also id. at 652 (“[A] fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-
serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a 
duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that 
information.”). 
154 The SEC is careful to note that the Rule does not displace judicially created 
doctrine.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 preliminary note (2009).   
155 Id. § 240.10b5-2(a) (emphasis added). 
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when (1) there is an agreement to “maintain information in confi-
dence”; (2) where the parties communicating such information have a 
“history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences” so as to create a 
reasonable inference “that the recipient will maintain confidentiality”; 
or (3) information is received from a “spouse, parent, child, or sibl-
ing,” although this presumption can be rebutted.156 
Nevertheless, in a recent high-profile case, a U.S. District Court re-
jected such an understanding of Rule 10b5-2.157  While the Court af-
firmed that the misappropriation theory does not require a fiduciary 
duty,158 as is the case under the classic insider trading theory, it held 
that a duty of confidentiality does not imply a duty not to trade in a 
security.  Rather, when confidential communications are made, there 
must not merely be an agreement to keep the information confiden-
tial but also an explicit agreement not to trade on the information.159 
156 Id. § 240.10b5-2(b).  In full, subsection (b) reads as follows: 
 (b) Enumerated “duties of trust or confidence.”  For purposes of this section, a “du-
ty of trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others: 
 (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
 (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information 
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of 
sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reason-
ably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic in-
formation expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or 
 (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information 
from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person 
receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust 
or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he 
or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who 
was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the 
information confidential, because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice 
of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement 
or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
157 See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“To permit 
liability based on Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) would exceed the SEC’s § 10(b) authority to pro-
scribe conduct that is deceptive.”). 
158 See id. at 726 (“[T]he court disagrees with his contention that, for a person to be 
held liable under the misappropriation theory, he must enter into an agreement that 
creates a relationship bearing all the hallmarks of a traditional fiduciary relationship.”). 
159 See id. at 725 (“The agreement, however, must consist of more than an express 
or implied promise merely to keep information confidential. . . . He must agree to 
maintain the confidentiality of the information and not to trade on or otherwise use it.  
Absent a duty not to use the information for personal benefit, there is no deception in 
doing so.”). 
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B.  Application to Political Intelligence 
Having briefly summarized the bases of insider trading liability, 
the remainder of this Part considers whether any are relevant to trad-
ing on political intelligence.  This Section concludes that current law 
does not support holding government insiders or outside actors liable 
for insider trading without substantially manipulating current doc-
trine.  First, government insiders, even if deemed “fiduciaries,” are not 
fiduciaries of the issuer of the securities in which they trade and can-
not be liable under the classic theory.  The misappropriation theory is 
tenuous absent an explicitly recognized duty of confidentiality among 
members of Congress.  Second, outside actors are not liable under the 
tipper/tippee theory because government insiders—the “tippers”—
are not fiduciaries of a security issuer.  Neither are outside actors lia-
ble under the misappropriation theory absent an explicit agreement 
of confidentiality because the very nature of lobbying implies that po-
litical information will be passed along to clients.   
1.  Government Insiders 
Several scholars, commentators, and politicians have argued that 
the insider trading doctrine outlined above does not capture trading 
on political information by government insiders.160  Yet, others believe 
it is covered by the current doctrine, either under the theory of classic 
insider trading161 or the misappropriation theory.162 
160 See, e.g., Barbabella, Cohen, Kardon & Molk, supra note 24, at 200 (arguing that 
although trading on political intelligence “presents some obvious analogues to corporate 
insider trading,” nevertheless “under current law, none of these described actions is illeg-
al”); Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading by Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1 (quoting Thomas Newkirk, a former official in the Division of En-
forcement at the SEC, as saying that “[i]f a congressman learns that his committee is 
about to do something that would affect a company, he can go trade on that because he 
is not obligated to keep that information confidential . . . . He is not breaching a duty of 
confidentiality to anybody and therefore he would not be liable for insider trading.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (“Under current law, 
Members of Congress and their staff do not owe a duty of confidentiality to Congress, 
and therefore are not liable for insider trading.”); Stephen Bainbridge, Insiders on the Hill, 
TCSDAILY, Mar. 30, 2006, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=033006D (“Effective 
regulation of problematic Congressional trading thus requires a broader prohibition 
than the securities law definition of insider trading.”). 
161 See Langevoort, supra note 23, at 34-35 (positing that government officials trad-
ing on political insider information breach a fiduciary duty owed to citizen investors). 
162 See George, supra note 23, at 166 (arguing that Senate and House ethical codes 
create a reasonable expectation of confidentiality). 
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First, Professor Langevoort argues that the classic theory of insider 
trading sufficiently covers government insiders.163  Professor Langevoort 
contends that when a politician possesses “information that will substan-
tially affect the price of an issuer’s securities” and then trades on such 
information, he is breaching a “duty of fair dealing” to the “country’s 
citizens” in contravention of Rule 10b-5.164  Professor Langevoort and 
others acknowledge that government insiders do not owe a fiduciary 
duty to the issuing corporation of the stock in which they trade but that 
an equivalent duty owed to the public suffices under the Chiarella fidu-
ciary duty requirement.  Professor Langevoort explains that, 
[l]ike the corporate insider, the government official has an advanta-
geous position as compared to the persons whom he is charged with 
serving.  Thus, the principle of preventing unjust enrichment applies as 
well in the case of a government official.  It follows that he should give 
up any trading profit coming to him because of his fiduciary position 
when other investors are harmed by the unavailability of information.
165
 
A number of courts have similarly found that elected officials owe du-
ties akin to fiduciary obligations to their constituents.166  These courts 
have not held that the duties owed by public officials are the same as fi-
duciary duties in the traditional corporate context, but they simply 
make the argument by analogy.167  Yet, to the extent that Congress con-
163 A decade prior to Professor Langevoort’s article, a law student argued that gov-
ernment insiders are liable for trading on political information.  See Krimmel, supra 
note 21, at 1492 (proposing that government insiders violate Rule 10b-5 when they use 
confidential information to purchase securities for their own benefit).   
164 Langevoort, supra note 23, at 34; see also Krimmel, supra note 21, at 1503 
(“While a government employee bears no traditional or special fiduciary obligation as 
such to the shareholders of any specific corporation, he certainly owes a duty to the 
government, and eventually therefore to the public at large, for the proper perfor-
mance of his responsibilities.”). 
165 Langevoort, supra note 23, at 34-35. 
166 See, e.g., United States v. Woodard, 459 F.3d 1078, 1086 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A] 
public official . . . owe[s] a fiduciary duty to the public to make governmental decisions 
in the public’s best interest . . . .” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 
534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t was clearly improper and therefore actionable under 
the mail fraud statute for the defendant to make use of inside advance information 
obtained by virtue of his official position for his own personal gain.”); United States v. 
Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Public confidence essential to the effective func-
tioning of government would be seriously impaired by any arrangement that would 
enable a few individuals to profit from advance knowledge of governmental action.”). 
167 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments:  Insider 
Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 49 BUS. LAW. 187, 245 (1993) (“Several courts and 
commentators analogized the government employee’s relationship with taxpayers as 
akin to that of fiduciary to beneficiary.”). 
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templated insider trading prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, 
it did so only with regard to corporate fiduciaries in a limited sense.168 
Nonetheless, Professor Langevoort’s application seems to miss the 
major limitation imposed by Chiarella, namely that trading on material 
nonpublic information only violates Rule 10b-5 where the trader owes 
a fiduciary duty to the corporate issuer of the security.  In this regard, 
it is irrelevant whether government insiders are fiduciaries of the pub-
lic at large.  Without a fiduciary duty owed to the issuer, a government 
insider would not be liable under the classic theory of insider trading. 
A second argument advanced is that government insiders are lia-
ble under the misappropriation theory.169  This argument maintains 
that members of Congress and Capitol Hill staffers are bound by a du-
ty of confidentiality laid out in the Code of Ethics, discussed earlier.170  
For example, Senate Rule 29(5) provides expulsion or punishment for 
any “Senator, officer, or employee of the Senate who shall disclose the 
secret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate.”171  Ac-
cordingly, it is argued that these contractual provisions are sufficient 
to create a duty of “trust or confidence” under Rule 10b5-2 that is 
breached when members misappropriate information for trading 
purposes.172  Likewise, Professor Bainbridge agrees that congressional 
ethics limitations “should suffice” to establish the requisite trust and 
confidence under the misappropriation theory.173 
168 See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 55 (1934) (“Among the most vicious practices un-
earthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fi-
duciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of 
trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid 
them in their market activities.”). 
169 See George, supra note 23, at 163 (arguing that the misappropriation theory is 
viable because legislators and their staffers possess a duty of confidentiality and be-
cause congressional information is not always public).  In addition, George argues that 
staffers breach fiduciary duties owed to their legislator-employers arising out of the 
principal/agent relationship.  See id. at 165-66 (asserting that staffers who relay political 
intelligence “breach traditional fiduciary duties arising out of principal/agent relation-
ships with the legislators or with higher ranking staffers who are their employers” and 
“almost certainly break duties arising out of ethical rules as well as duties arising from 
history, pattern, or practice”). 
170 See id. at 166 (concluding that Paragraph Eight of the Code of Ethics for Gov-
ernment Service creates a “duty-by-agreement . . . because it is binding upon all mem-
bers of the Federal Government as a condition of employment.”). 
171 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXIX(5), as reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 110-9, 
at 42 (2007). 
172 George, supra note 23, at 166. 
173 Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 9. 
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Other scholars dismiss both theories.174  Although they acknowl-
edge a consensus that “congressional representatives ought to place 
public interests first,” a lack of a “concrete duty” has prevented en-
forcement actions under current law.175  Accordingly, “[i]f congres-
sional representatives and others are to be barred from engaging in 
such activities, regulation appears necessary insofar as it overcomes 
legislators’ lack of a well-defined duty.”176 
These arguments are correct in stating that, at a minimum, there 
is a lack of consensus and understanding among members of Con-
gress about the duties of trust and confidence owed.  This is evi-
denced by the fact that members themselves have introduced legisla-
tion to clarify the extent of their duties with regard to insider trading 
rather than calling upon the SEC to enforce under the current re-
gime.177  When the Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation 
theory, it was in the context of a clearly understood and well-defined 
duty owed by an employee to his employer.178  If the misappropriation 
theory is enforced absent a concrete duty, there will be virtually no 
limit to swallowing up unwary confidants.179  This certainly should not 
be the goal of the misappropriation theory. 
Perhaps the best argument that government insiders are liable 
under the misappropriation theory stems not from a duty of trust or 
confidence based upon House or Senate ethics rules, but instead 
upon fiduciary duties stemming from the government insiders’ em-
ployment relationship.  Professor Bainbridge makes this argument 
with regard to Capitol Hill staff (employees) who he claims have fidu-
ciary duties to the members of Congress for whom they work (em-
ployers).180  Under the misappropriation theory, a congressional em-
ployee has a duty not to trade on information acquired from her 
174 See Barbabella, Cohen, Kardon & Molk, supra note 24, at 215-17 (arguing that 
no theory of insider trading applies to trading on nonpublic material information ob-
tained by members of Congress by virtue of their office).   
175 Id. at 217. 
176 Id.  
177 See infra Section III.A. 
178 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (finding misappropriation 
where “O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm, 
Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer for Pillsbury common stock”). 
179 SEC v. Cuban prevents this by requiring not merely an agreement of confidentiali-
ty but also an agreement not to trade.  634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
180 See Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 9 (“These employment relationships should 
suffice for Congressional staffers to be deemed to have an agency or other relationship 
of trust and confidence with their employing agency.”).   
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employer, a member of Congress.181  Professor Bainbridge argues that 
this employment relationship is sufficient to sustain liability for em-
ployee staff members but not for members of Congress—the employ-
ers.182  This approach fails to appreciate the potential reach of the ar-
gument, however, because members of Congress, like their staff, could 
also be deemed employees of the federal government.  Accordingly, a 
better approach would not distinguish between congressional staff 
and elected members of Congress but would instead classify both 
groups as “employees” of the federal government, each owing fidu-
ciary duties to its “employer,” the federal government.183  Under this 
characterization, it is difficult to distinguish misappropriation of polit-
ical information by government insiders (politicians and staff alike) 
from misappropriation of information from one’s employer in the 
traditional misappropriation cases. 
Against this approach, however, is an intuition in favor of treating 
a member of Congress as her own boss—and hence, as an “employ-
er”—and against treating members of Congress as “employees” of the 
federal government.  This is true not only of Professor Bainbridge’s 
argument, but it is apparent in other contexts as well.184  On the one 
hand, members of Congress receive a paycheck from the federal gov-
ernment.  On the other hand, there is a sense that members of Con-
gress are not like employees because their public election gives them 
autonomy to make decisions as they see fit without being accountable 
to anyone but their constituency (and to that extent, only in subse-
quent elections).  Furthermore, unlike employees, members of Con-
gress are not in a clear principal/agent relationship with the federal 
government and, accordingly, are not accountable to the federal gov-
ernment as are typical “employees.”  These observations suggest that 
members of Congress are only “employees” because they formally re-
ceive a paycheck from the federal government while they functionally 
behave more like employers. 
There is no consensus as to whether politicians are “employees” or 
“employers.”  Similar to the disagreement over the question whether 
181 See id. at 10 (“Put into O’Hagan’s terminology, ‘a [staffer’s] undisclosed, self 
serving use of [Congressional] information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a 
duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the [Congress].’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652)). 
182 See id. at 12 (“As an employer, a member of Congress is free to trade; as an em-
ployee, the staffer is not.”). 
183 I credit Professor Tyson for developing this argument.   
184 See, e.g., infra note 237 and accompanying text (suggesting that members of 
Parliament in the United Kingdom are not fiduciaries of the British Government).  
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members of Congress and their staff are bound by a duty of trust or 
confidence sufficient to give rise to liability under the misappropria-
tion theory, there is also disagreement over whether members of 
Congress are “employees” who could satisfy the misappropriation 
theory.  This confusion suggests that regardless of one’s view of the 
status of government insiders, it would be controversial to apply insid-
er trading doctrine in this situation, to say the least.  It would be un-
wise to extend insider trading liability where its application is tenuous, 
as would be the case under either misappropriation approach. 
2.  Outside Actors 
Outside actors—lobbyists and hedge funds—present a different set 
of issues that makes them even less likely to be considered inside traders 
under current doctrine.  First, classic insider trading theory is inapplic-
able unless the outside actor owes a fiduciary duty to the issuer of the 
security in which he trades.185  For example, the classic theory would 
apply if corporate executives hired a lobbyist and then traded in their 
own companies’ securities based on the political information acquired.  
However, this situation is unlikely because the political-intelligence 
practice is dominated by hedge fund clients who do not have fiduciary 
relationships with the issuers of the stock in which they trade. 
Second, tipper/tippee liability will depend entirely on whether 
the government insider—the tipper—is a fiduciary not merely to the 
public at large, but specifically to the issuer of the security.  Assuming 
arguendo that government insiders are fiduciaries, outside actors 
would inherit the fiduciary duty of the insider only if the insider were 
to breach her duty.186  An insider breaches her duty only if she receives 
some sort of personal benefit in exchange for the inside informa-
tion,187 and courts have interpreted what constitutes a personal benefit 
185 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
186 The Supreme Court stated in Dirks that 
some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not because 
they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available 
to them improperly . . . when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows 
or should know that there has been a breach. 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
187 See id. at 662 (“Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, di-
rectly or indirectly, from his disclosure.  Absent some personal gain, there has been no 
breach of duty to stockholders.”). 
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very broadly.188  The best argument for finding liability here is that 
government insiders pass along information to their K Street chums 
for a political contribution, reputational advantage, “warm glow” ef-
fect, or expectation of future employment.  There certainly is a “re-
volving door” between K Street and Capitol Hill.189  A “personal bene-
fit” analysis would require a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry into the 
relationships between government insiders and lobbyists and would 
somehow have to measure fuzzy reputational advantages or determine 
future employment opportunities.  All this is, however, moot, since 
the tipper/tippee theory will not apply even if a benefit can be con-
strued.  The government insider must have a fiduciary relationship 
with the issuer of the security in which the tippee trades, not merely 
with the general public.190 
Third, the misappropriation theory presents a more viable applica-
tion to outside actors.  Since the misappropriation theory severs the fi-
duciary requirement between trader and issuer, we can simply look at 
whether the outside actor has breached a duty of confidentiality with 
the government insider.  As we saw, Rule 10b5-2 provides a nonexclu-
sive definition of the duty of trust and confidence.  Such a duty may 
arise explicitly through an agreement or through a “history, pattern, or 
practice of sharing confidences.”191  For instance, in the asbestos exam-
ple, there was an indication that the information was to be kept confi-
dential:  when the information was relayed to the press, its release was 
conditioned upon the information not being published until the morn-
ing of the official announcement.192  If the same condition were placed 
upon the communication to the lobbyist, then there arguably would be 
an agreement “to maintain information in confidence.”193 
One could also argue that there is a pattern of sharing confidences 
between lobbyists and government insiders that establishes a general 
188 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.   
189 See Gail Russell Chaddock, Republicans Take over K Street, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Aug. 29, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 2280355 (quoting Frank Clemente, 
director of Public Citizen’s Congress Project, as saying that “[t]he revolving door is be-
coming more comfortably established and institutionalized”). 
190 I have other concerns with pursuing this approach under tipper/tippee liabili-
ty.  Specifically, imposing the vague contours of tipper/tippee liability would limit con-
structive exchanges between Capitol Hill and constituent groups, often represented by 
lobbyists, because it may be impossible to determine ex ante whether liability would 
arise.  I consider this further in Part V. 
191 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2) (2009). 
192 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1). 
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duty of confidentiality.  Lobbying, however, by its very nature contra-
dicts this argument.  Government insiders know that lobbyists always 
represent someone—that lobbyists are mere liaisons between Capitol 
Hill and the constituent group—and they presume that the discussions 
will be relayed back.  It would be unlikely that the lobbyist would not 
share the information absent an explicit agreement not to do so. 
Application of the misappropriation theory could be further 
complicated by the holding in SEC v. Cuban that there must also be an 
explicit agreement not to trade using the confidential information.194  
The court acknowledged that “nondisclosure and non-use are logically 
distinct.”195  This requirement seems to suggest that the lobbyist him-
self could trade on acquired information unless he agreed not to do 
so.  The lobbyist, however, would breach confidentiality by sharing in-
formation with a client regardless of whether the lobbyist agreed not 
to trade.  This is unlikely to be an issue since lobbyists, in practice, 
pass political intelligence along to their clients.  If, however, a consti-
tuent receives political intelligence directly from Capitol Hill, and she 
is able to maintain confidentiality while trading,196 an explicit agree-
ment not to trade would be required under the court’s test.197 
3.  Conclusion 
Though insider trading liability could arguably exist for govern-
ment insiders and outside actors, such an expansive reading would 
have profound consequences for current insider trading doctrine.  
First, as it pertains to government insiders, the classic theory is inap-
plicable because it requires a fiduciary relationship between the party 
trading and the issuer of the security being traded.  Accordingly, even 
assuming that government insiders have a fiduciary relationship with 
the public at large, that fiduciary relationship would be insufficient 
because it is not with the issuer of the security being traded.  This as-
sumption is heroic because, at most, courts have analogized public 
figures to fiduciaries but have not explicitly named them as such.  
Second, the misappropriation theory is more tenable, but holding 
public officials and employees liable would require either inferring a 
duty of trust or confidence arising from their public service or classify-
194 See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
195 SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (footnote omitted). 
196 See id. (“A person who receives material, nonpublic information may in fact preserve 
the confidentiality of that information while simultaneously using it for his own gain.”). 
197 See supra note 159. 
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ing public officials as “employees” of the federal government.  It is 
clear that there is no consensus regarding such a duty or employment 
status, as demonstrated by the fact that members of Congress them-
selves are sponsoring legislation that would clarify the issue rather 
than relying on current law.  Pursuing government insiders under any 
of these theories would require stretching current doctrine beyond 
what it can legitimately sustain. 
With regard to outside actors, insider trading liability is even more 
attenuated.  First, tipper/tippee liability suffers the same fate as the 
classic theory for government insiders, since a tippee’s liability de-
pends on the tipper having a fiduciary relationship with the issuer.  
Second, the misappropriation theory may apply if there is an explicit 
understanding of confidentiality.  In practice, however, this will sel-
dom be the case, since it is the lobbyist’s job to share political infor-
mation with her clients. 
Lastly, one should be concerned that such convoluted and inde-
terminate application of the federal securities laws to democratic 
processes may severely hamper political dialogue as well as market ef-
ficiency.  Part V explores these ramifications further, but for now it 
will suffice to make a few preliminary comments.  First, fear of crimi-
nal liability for insider trading will make government insiders think 
twice before meeting and sharing information with constituents.  
These exchanges of ideas and information between Capitol Hill and 
the American public are invaluable to building consensus, writing in-
formed legislation, and preventing congressional insularity.  Second, 
market efficiency depends on delivering accurate information to the 
marketplace, information that is then impounded into asset prices.  
Information gatherers—such as market analysts or, here, lobbyists 
hired by hedge funds—perform the valuable service of ferreting out 
information that will eventually be reflected in accurate and efficient 
market prices.198  One should not lose sight of the unintended conse-
quences resulting from applying insider trading doctrine to political-
intelligence trading. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF U.K. INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Part II concluded that current insider trading doctrine does not 
sufficiently support liability for trading on political information.  This 
Part considers recent legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress 
198 I am grateful to Professor Fisch for calling this argument to my attention. 
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aimed at remedying this “loophole.”  It then turns to a comparative 
analysis of the insider trading law of the United Kingdom, which does 
prohibit government officials and outsiders from trading on political 
information.  This Part concludes that the U.K. law is not instructive 
because of significant differences between U.K. and U.S. insider trad-
ing law and policy objectives. 
A.  Recent Legislative Proposals Considered by the U.S. Congress 
The 2005 media attention surrounding the growing practice of 
political-intelligence gathering caught the attention of two Democrat-
ic members of the House of Representatives.199  Representative Louise 
Slaughter of New York, chairwoman of the House Rules Committee, 
and Representative Brian Baird of Washington have introduced legis-
lation in recent Congresses that would bring trading based on politi-
cal intelligence—by government insiders and outside actors—under 
the umbrella of the federal securities laws.  The legislation would also 
require lobbyists to disclose their political intelligence clients.  But the 
legislation has proven politically unpalatable.  As outlined below, after 
introducing broad legislation in 2006 and 2007, separate legislation 
was introduced in 2008 that only sought to require disclosure of polit-
ical-intelligence activities.  In 2009, Representatives Baird and Slaugh-
ter reintroduced the more comprehensive legislative proposal.  The 
current economic and political climate has evidenced an appetite for 
financial regulation, and, in 2009, the legislation received its first con-
gressional hearing. 
1.  Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act 
Representatives Baird and Slaughter introduced variations of the 
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act) in the 
109th,200 110th,201 and 111th202 Congresses.  The STOCK Acts of the 110th 
199 See Press Release, Baird, supra note 15; see also Macey, supra note 46, at 309 (“In 
response to the ‘shocking’ news of public officials using their official positions for per-
sonal gain, Louise Slaughter, the chair of the House Rules Committee (D-NY) and 
Brian Baird (D-WA) proposed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act.”). 
200 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006); 
see also Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Baird, Slaughter Seek Capitol Hill Insid-
er Trading Ban (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ 
wa03_baird/STOCKAct032806.html (announcing the introduction of legislation by Rep-
resentatives Baird and Slaughter to “stop insider trading on Capitol Hill”). 
201 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 2341, 110th Cong. 
(2007); see also Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (announcing the reintroduction of 
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and 111th Congress were identical.  A few changes were made between 
the 109th and the 110th versions that likely signify political compromise. 
First, the STOCK Act seeks “[t]o prohibit securities trading based 
on nonpublic information relating to Congress.”203  The legislation 
would accomplish this by amending the Exchange Act to require the 
SEC to promulgate a rule prohibiting trading on material nonpublic 
information relating to legislation if the information was (1) “obtained 
by reason of such person being a Member or employee of Congress” or 
(2) “obtained from a Member or employee of Congress, and such per-
son knows that the information was so obtained.”204  In addition, the 
STOCK Act would amend congressional rules to prohibit members and 
staff from sharing material nonpublic information with individuals be-
lieved to be using the information for trading purposes.205 
Second, the bill seeks timely disclosure of the securities transac-
tions of members of Congress, officers, and employees.206  Specifically, 
it would amend the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to require 
members of Congress to disclose, within ninety days, any “purchase, 
sale, or exchange of any stocks, bonds, commodities futures, or other 
forms of securities” involving at least $1000.207 
Third, the legislation amends the LDA to bring political-
intelligence activity in line with general lobbying.  Specifically, it 
would require public reporting of “political intelligence activities” by 
Representatives Baird and Slaughter’s legislation to prohibit insider trading, and re-
porting that the new bill was “strengthened to apply to all employees of the executive 
branch, in addition to Congressional staffers and Members of Congress”). 
202 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682, 111th Cong. (2009); 
see also Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (announcing the reintroduction of the 
STOCK Act). 
203 H.R. 5015; accord H.R. 682; H.R. 2341.  The original 2006 bill only applied to the 
legislative branch, but the 2007 and 2009 legislation extended to all federal employees 
who derive material nonpublic information from their employment and to information 
obtained from those employees.  H.R. 682 sec. 2, § 10; H.R. 2341 sec. 2, § 10. 
204 H.R. 682 sec. 2(a), § 10(c); H.R. 2341 sec. 2(a), § 10(c); H.R. 5015 sec. 2(a), 
§ 10(c).  Parallel prohibitions apply to other federal employees.  H.R. 682 sec. 2(a), 
§ 10(d); H.R. 2341 sec. 2(a), § 10(d).  
205 H.R. 682 § 3; H.R. 2341 § 3.  Originally, this was to be accomplished through 
an SEC rule prohibiting members or staff from disclosing legislative information if the 
member or staff “has reason to believe” that the information will be used for trading 
purposes.  H.R. 5015 sec. 2(a), § 10(c)(2).  Certainly, the ethics approach in the cur-
rent legislation is less potent than a corresponding amendment to the Exchange Act 
and likely represents an accommodation. 
206 H.R. 682 § 4; H.R. 2341 § 4; H.R. 5015 § 3. 
207 H.R. 682 sec. 4(a), § 103(l); H.R. 2341 sec. 4(a), § 103(l); H.R. 5015 sec. 3(a), 
§ 103(l).  Originally, the legislation introduced in the 109th Congress had a thirty-day 
filing requirement.  H.R. 5015 sec. 3(a), § 103(l). 
1494 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1451 
“political intelligence consultant[s].”208  Political-intelligence activi-
ties are “political intelligence contacts” and efforts in support of 
such contacts.209  A political-intelligence contact is defined as any 
communication to or from the legislative or executive branch that 
results in information “intended for use in analyzing securities or 
commodities markets, or in informing investment decisions, and 
which is made on behalf of a client” regarding “the formulation, 
modification, or adoption of Federal legislation.”210 
The legislation received fourteen cosponsors in the 109th Con-
gress, including Representative Slaughter and excluding the bill’s 
primary sponsor, Representative Baird.211  It was referred to several 
committees but failed to receive any action.212  The legislation intro-
duced in the 110th Congress received ten cosponsors, including Rep-
resentative Slaughter and excluding the primary sponsor, Representa-
tive Baird.213  Again, the legislation was referred to committee but did 
not move.214  In the 111th Congress, there are currently seven cospon-
sors, excluding the primary sponsor, Representative Baird.215  In 2009, 
the legislation received its first hearing, conducted by the Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Fi-
nancial Services, which took testimony from Representatives Slaughter 
and Baird, the SEC Inspector General, and three academics.216 
208 H.R. 682 sec. 5(a)(1), § 3(2); H.R. 2341 sec. 5(a)(1), § 3(2); H.R. 5015 
sec. 4(a)(1), § 3(2). 
209 H.R. 682 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(17); H.R. 2341 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(17).  The 2006 legis-
lation only covered contacts to the legislative branch.  H.R. 5015 sec. 4(a)(2), § 3(18). 
210 H.R. 682 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(18); H.R. 2341 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(18); cf. H.R. 5015 
sec. 4(a)(2), § 3(18) (applying the same rule but only to the legislative branch). 
211 See 152 CONG. REC. H1195 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H1563 
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H1853 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2006); 152 CONG. 
REC. H1917 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H2586 (daily ed. May 11, 2006). 
212 House Bill 5015 was referred to the House Committees on Financial Services, 
Administration, Agriculture, and the Judiciary.  H.R. 5015. 
213 See 153 CONG. REC. H5290 (daily ed. May 16, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H6236 
(daily ed. June 11, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H7340 (daily ed. June 27, 2007); 153 CONG. 
REC. H8121 (daily ed. July 18, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H11,028 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 
2007); 154 CONG. REC. H5408 (daily ed. June 12, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H10,642 (dai-
ly ed. Sept. 29, 2008). 
214 House Bill 2341 was referred to the same committees as the 2006 bill as well as 
to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.  H.R. 2341. 
215 See 155 CONG. REC. H525 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H3706 (dai-
ly ed. Mar. 19, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H8009 (daily ed. July 10, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. 
H8302 (daily ed. July 16, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H8356 (daily ed. July 17, 2009); 155 
CONG. REC. H13,386 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009). 
216 See Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48. 
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2.  Political Intelligence Disclosure Act 
Representatives Baird and Slaughter introduced the Political In-
telligence Disclosure Act in the 110th Congress,217 but they have not 
yet reintroduced it in the 111th Congress.  The legislation sought to 
amend the LDA to require public reporting of political-intelligence 
activities in precisely the same way as the STOCK Act.218  Representa-
tives Slaughter and Baird noted that the Bill “was inspired by legisla-
tion [they] introduced in the 109th and 110th Congresses that prohi-
bits Members of Congress and federal employees from profiting from 
nonpublic information they obtained from their official positions.”219  
In the 110th Congress, the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act re-
ceived only one cosponsor in addition to Representatives Baird and 
Slaughter.220  It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary 
and did not receive any action.221 
The fact that Representatives Baird and Slaughter chose to intro-
duce the political-intelligence disclosure portion of the STOCK Act as 
a stand-alone bill suggests political maneuvering.  It will certainly be 
easier to get Congress to accept the Political Intelligence Disclosure 
Act by itself than the STOCK Act by itself, which would regulate the 
members themselves and expose them to insider trading liability.222  
While Representatives Baird and Slaughter continue to push for the 
much broader insider trading regulation prescribed by the STOCK 
Act, the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act remains much more pa-
latable to members of Congress. 
217 Political Intelligence Disclosure Act, H.R. 5617, 110th Cong. (2008); see also Press 
Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Reps. Slaughter and Baird Introduce Bill to Regulate 
Political Intelligence Gathering (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
list/press/wa03_baird/politicalintelbill.html (announcing the introduction of the Politi-
cal Intelligence Disclosure Act, and characterizing the legislation as “a bill that requires 
political intelligence firms to disclose their clients, profits, and activities, in the same way 
that lobbyists are required to do under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”). 
218 See H.R. 5617 (stating its purpose as being “to amend the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act of 1995 to require the disclosure of political intelligence activities”). 
219 Press Release, Baird, supra note 217. 
220 See 154 CONG. REC. H1701 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H3109 
(daily ed. May 6, 2008). 
221 See H.R. 5617. 
222 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 46, at 309 (“The proposed legislation was killed in 
congressional committee.  Clearly, the SEC did not want to offend the politicians that 
both oversee the agency and determine its funding.”). 
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B.  Insider Trading Law in the United Kingdom 
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom regulates insider 
trading through a comprehensive statutory regime.  Insider trading 
was not a crime in the United Kingdom until Parliament implemented 
the Companies Act 1980 (Companies Act).223  The Companies Act was 
consolidated five years later in the Company Securities (Insider Deal-
ing) Act 1985 (Insider Dealing Act).224  The Insider Dealing Act pro-
hibited insiders from trading “(1) on the basis of unpublished price-
sensitive information, (2) in the securities of the company of which he 
is an insider, (3) on a recognized stock exchange.”225  The Insider 
Dealing Act defined insider as any individual who is, or had been with-
in the previous six months, an employee, officer, or director of the 
corporation, or was professionally related to the company.226 
The Insider Dealing Act explicitly included government em-
ployees in its definition of “insider,” prohibiting “insider trading by 
crown servants and those who knowingly obtain inside information 
from crown servants.”227  The Financial Services Act 1986 extended the 
scope of the prohibition to all public servants.228  The United King-
dom thus prohibited trading on political or governmental informa-
tion by all royal and civil servants and by all outside individuals receiv-
ing information from these servants.229 
223 Companies Act, 1980, c. 22, §§ 68–73 (U.K.); see also Alexander F. Loke, From the 
Fiduciary Theory to Information Abuse:  The Changing Fabric of Insider Trading Law in the U.K., 
Australia and Singapore, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 138 (2006) (“It was only in 1980 that in-
sider trading became a crime under U.K. law, through Companies Act 1980 Part V.”). 
224 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, c. 8, §§ 1–19 (U.K.). 
225 Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 375, 389 (footnotes omitted); see also Company Securi-
ties (Insider Dealing) Act § 1. 
226 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act §§ 1, 9. 
227 Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 225, at 390; see also Company Securities (Insid-
er Dealing) Act § 2 (prohibiting trading on information “held by a Crown servant or 
former Crown servant” or obtained from a current or former Crown servant that the 
servant should reasonably expect not to disclose or that involves “unpublished price 
sensitive information in relation to securities of a particular company”). 
228 See Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 173 (U.K.) (substituting the word “pub-
lic” for the word “Crown” wherever it occurs). 
229 See generally FLETCHER, supra note 131, at 226 (“In the United Kingdom, govern-
ment employees are deemed insiders for purposes of the U.K.’s insider trading prohibi-
tions.  The Insider Dealing Act specifically prohibits insider trading by Crown servants 
and those who knowingly obtain insider information from Crown Servants.  Other coun-
tries that have statutory definitions of ‘insider’ similarly include government em-
ployees.”); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense:  An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regu-
lation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 242 n.266 (1991) (summarizing the U.K. prohibition); Mark A. 
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In 1989, the Council of the European Communities (the predeces-
sor to the European Union) promulgated the European Economic 
Community Directive Coordinating Insider Trading (1989 Directive).230  
The 1989 Directive set a minimum floor for European Community 
member states’ insider trading laws.231  Specifically, member states, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, are required to prohibit trading based on 
inside information that is obtained (1) because of “membership [in] 
the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer,” 
(2) as a stockholder in the corporation, or (3) because of access to in-
formation “by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or 
duties.”232  In 2003, the 1989 Directive was replaced with a more com-
prehensive directive (2003 Directive), which covers options trading as 
well as market manipulation.233  The 2003 Directive retains the same de-
finitions of insider trading as the 1989 Directive and should be viewed 
as complementary to the earlier Directive.234 
The E.U. definition of “insider” does not draw the same fiduciary 
line that U.S. law does,235 although there could be significant overlap.  
Spitz, Note, Recent Developments in Insider Trading Laws and Problems of Enforcement in Great 
Britain, 12 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 275-83 (1989) (providing an overview of the 
United Kingdom’s statutory prohibitions against insider trading). 
230 Council Directive 89/592/EEC, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 
1989 O.J. (L 334) 30. 
231 Id. art. V; see also Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and 
Prompt Disclosure:  A Comparative Analysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 662 n.142 
(2001) (“The Directive, for example, sets forth minimum standards for defining the 
concepts of ‘inside information’ and ‘insider’ with respect to which Member States of 
the European Union must comply.”). 
232 Council Directive 89/592/EEC, art. II; see also Council Directive 2003/6/EC, art. 
2(1), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 21 (listing the same three types of forbidden inside informa-
tion and also including information obtained “by virtue of . . . criminal activities”). 
233 See Council Directive 2003/6/EC, art. 1; see also Eric Engle, Insider Trading in 
U.S. and E.U. Law:  A Comparison 26 (Sept. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271868 (surveying the efforts of the European 
Community to create a Community standard on prohibitions against insider trading). 
234 See Engle, supra note 233, at 27 (“The basic premises of the 1989 Directive are re-
tained within the 2003 Directive and the 1989 Directive may be persuasive evidence of 
the meaning of the 2003 Directive.”); id. at 30 (“In all events, the judicial interpretations 
of the meaning of the earlier Directive very likely apply to the successor Directive.”). 
235 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 23 (1999) (“[U]nlike the U.S. insider trading laws, determination of 
illegal trading is based not on breach of a fiduciary duty, but rather, on possession of 
non-public information.”); Carolyn Silane, Electronic Data Theft:  A Legal Loophole for Ille-
gally-Obtained Information—A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Insider Trading Law, 5 
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 333, 352 (2009) (“Unlike the United States, the E.U. has 
soundly rejected any requirement of a fiduciary duty in favor of a straightforward rule 
against an imbalance of information in securities transactions.”). 
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As a result, “[s]ome of the professionals [covered by the 1989 Direc-
tive] may have a contractual relationship with the issuer which is not 
of a fiduciary character.”236  Others who do not have a contractual or 
fiduciary relationship with the security issuer are still covered, includ-
ing “members of the central bank, the press, the parliament, the minis-
try of economics and of other institutions, committees and bodies who 
may possess inside information because of their profession or their 
duties.”237  The Directive’s broad definition suggests that the Council 
was promulgating a definition of insider trading that would prohibit 
trading based on political intelligence in the entire European Union. 
In compliance with the 1989 Directive, the United Kingdom 
enacted Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Criminal Justice 
Act).238  Part V of the Act “completely replaced the existing law on in-
sider trading” in the United Kingdom.239  The Criminal Justice Act de-
fines “insider” along the same lines as the Directives, including the 
expansive definition of inside information as information obtained 
“by virtue of [one’s] employment, office or profession.”240  The Crimi-
nal Justice Act does not specifically classify “public servants” as insid-
ers.  Nonetheless, this prong is considered broad enough to encom-
pass “public servants,” consistent with the insider trading regime that 
the Criminal Justice Act replaced.241  The United Kingdom, despite 
amendments to its insider trading statutes over the past thirty years, 
remains committed to the categorical prohibition of trading based on 
inside political intelligence. 
U.K. and E.U. law suggest an approach that may serve as an ex-
ample for the United States.  Representatives Baird and Slaughter at-
tempt to import a component of the U.K./E.U. prohibition into 
American doctrine, but doing so is flawed because U.K./E.U. insider 
trading doctrine departs markedly from that of the United States.  
236 Klaus J. Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
51, 64 (1990). 
237 Id. (emphasis added). 
238 Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, §§ 52–64 (U.K.). 
239 Richard G. Small, Towards a Theory of Contextual Transplants, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
1431, 1453 (2005); see also Keith Wotherspoon, Insider Dealing—The New Law:  Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993, 57 MOD. L. REV. 419, 420 (1994) (“[P]rovisions in Part V of the 
1993 Act wholly supersede the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 . . . .”). 
240 Criminal Justice Act 1993 § 57(2). 
241 See Wotherspoon, supra note 239, at 426 (“The provision in section 57(2)(a)(ii) is 
also wide enough to cover public servants whose official duties give them access to price-
sensitive information.” (footnote omitted)).  This would include, for example, “officials 
in the Bank of England or the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.”  Id. at 426 n.57. 
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First, unlike the United Kingdom and the European Union, the Unit-
ed States does not provide a statutory definition of insider trading.  As 
demonstrated in Part II, insider trading has come to be defined by 
judicial interpretation.  Though this does not preclude legislative de-
finition, it suggests that the Baird-Slaughter legislation would only add 
to an already ad hoc insider trading regime. 
Second, U.K. law does not provide a good point of reference be-
cause the United Kingdom (and the European Union) wholly em-
braces an access-to-information theory of insider trading regulation.242  
Part IV shows how an access-to-information theory can help to make 
sense of the policy motivations underlying insider trading law, but 
these have been rejected by U.S. courts.243  Rather, Part II demonstrat-
ed that the U.S. approach is inextricably linked with fiduciary duties.  
The U.K. prohibition and the E.U. Directives sever any fiduciary re-
quirement.244  The Baird-Slaughter legislation attempts to regulate 
outside actors who have access to political information, which may 
make sense under a regime predicated upon an access-to-information 
theory, but not under a regime rooted in fiduciary duty concepts, as is 
the case in the United States. 
Third, consideration of U.S. insider trading doctrine’s objectives 
militates against adopting an approach similar to those of the United 
Kingdom and the European Union.  Part IV considers whether in-
sider trading law should include trading upon political intelligence 
and concludes that many policy objectives animating U.S. insider 
trading law generally are inapplicable to the political-intelligence 
context and that, in at least one context, insider trading regulation 
would not sufficiently address these political corruption issues.  Ac-
cordingly, an ethics approach that makes use of such tools as a blind 
trust—whereby members of Congress are completely unaware of 
current and prospective investments—is the best mechanism for 
preventing trading on political intelligence. 
242 See Loke, supra note 223, at 126-37 (arguing that the United States still takes a 
fiduciary approach while other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have moved 
toward a theory that defines insider trading by access to information); Silane, supra 
note 235, at 352 (“Unlike the United States, the E.U. has soundly rejected any re-
quirement of fiduciary duty in favor of a straightforward rule against an imbalance of 
information in securities transactions.”). 
243 See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A DEFINITION  
OF INSIDER TRADING THAT INCLUDES TRADING ON  
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE? 
One of the great debates about insider trading has been whether to 
regulate it at all.  Numerous scholars have rejected insider trading pro-
hibitions as contrary to the fundamental aim of efficient markets.245  
That debate is outside the scope of this Comment.  Accordingly, this 
Part puts aside the deregulation discussion and assumes the current 
regulatory regime.  As became clear in Part II, current insider trading 
doctrine does not adequately accommodate regulating trading on polit-
ical intelligence.  A few theories of insider trading may arguably en-
compass certain political-intelligence trading activities.  As a response, 
legislation introduced in Congress is seeking to clarify the situation and 
to follow the United Kingdom in bringing political-intelligence trading 
within securities law.  This Part asks whether this is a result to be de-
sired.  Specifically, what normative justifications animate the U.S. pro-
hibition on insider trading?  Do these underlying public policy consid-
erations support a ban on political-intelligence trading?246 
To begin, the Exchange Act was enacted to protect the integrity of 
the financial markets.247  Congress has adhered to this sweeping justifi-
cation, noting that trading on material nonpublic information threat-
245 See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) 
(arguing that insider trading is beneficial because it causes market prices of securities 
to more accurately reflect the price of stocks had the inside information been public, 
thus helping all investors and the company). 
246 Another approach has been to consider political-intelligence trading against the 
arguments for deregulating insider trading.  See Barbabella, Cohen, Kardon & Molk, su-
pra note 24, at 223-34.  This approach, which asks whether the general arguments in fa-
vor of deregulating insider trading also support not regulating political-intelligence trad-
ing, is flawed for two reasons.  First, the arguments for deregulation have been rejected.  
They have failed to prevail in the traditional corporate context, so why are they relevant 
to political intelligence?  Second, the deregulation approach assumes the wrong baseline 
for evaluating whether to include trading on political intelligence in the insider trading 
framework.  The starting point for considering political-intelligence trading is the status 
quo of no regulation.  The question, then, is whether we should regulate.  In asking this 
question, we look to the normative reasons for regulating insider trading generally and 
ask whether they are salient in the context of political intelligence.  If the arguments for 
regulating corporate insider trading are persuasive in the context of political intelli-
gence, they will militate in favor of insider trading regulation. 
247 See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2-5, 13 (1934) (identifying the purpose of the bill as 
regulating the stock exchange in order to curb harmful speculation); S. REP. NO. 73-792, 
at 3, 9 (1934) (same); 1944 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (noting the “inequitable character” of in-
sider trading and various provisions in the 1934 Act designed to curtail this abuse). 
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ens “the fair and honest operation of our securities markets.”248  The 
ABA Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading concluded that 
commonsense observations suggest that two of the traditional bases for 
prohibitions against insider trading are still sound:  the “fair play” and 
“integrity of the markets” arguments.  The first relies on the basic policy 
that cheating is wrong and on the traditional sympathy for the victim of 
the cheat.  The second rests on the oft-repeated argument that people 
will not entrust their resources to a marketplace they don’t believe is fair, 
any more than a card player will put his chips on the table in a poker 
game that may be fixed.
249
 
Securities laws achieve “fair play” and “integrity” through intensive 
disclosure requirements that compel covered entities, particularly 
corporations, to make certain corporate information public. 
Such broad objectives of fairness and market integrity, however, 
provide very little guidance on their faces.  Any disparity of informa-
tion could certainly be deemed “unfair” and thus a threat to public 
confidence in the market.  Digging deeper, we find public policy ar-
guments divided into economic and noneconomic terms, namely, 
fairness.250  This Part briefly analyzes each justification and applies 
each to political intelligence. 
A.  Fairness 
The essence of the fairness argument is that something is inhe-
rently wrong when one trader possesses information unknown by 
another trader—the informational advantage is unfair.251  Insider trad-
ing law, however, has never presupposed a parity-of-information stan-
dard.252  In fact, true equality of information among all investors would 
undermine one investor’s ability to profit in the marketplace and ar-
guably destroy profit motive altogether.253  Others have proposed, in 
248 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 8 (1988); see also ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND 
INSIDER TRADING 2 (1993) (arguing that people will not trust their resources to a sys-
tem that they do not think is fair). 
249 Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on 
Regulation of Insider Trading (pt. 1), 41 BUS. LAW. 223, 227 (1985). 
250 This categorization follows Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 70-82. 
251 See Fisch, supra note 229, at 220-21 (“Whether other traders are harmed direct-
ly, such as by inducement to trade at an incorrect price, or indirectly, through the 
presence in the market of other traders who possess an overwhelming informational 
advantage, inequality of information is at the heart of the fairness rationale.”). 
252 See, e.g., Netter, Poulsen & Hersch, supra note 33, at 2 (arguing that possessing 
asymmetric information does not and should not violate insider trading law). 
253 See MACEY, supra note 100, at 21. 
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lieu of an equal-information standard, an equal-access-to-information 
approach.  In this regard, insider trading is perceived as unfair be-
cause the insider possesses a “lawful monopoly on access to the infor-
mation involved . . . which cannot be competed away.”254  The Su-
preme Court has expressly rejected, as legal theories, parity of infor-
information and equal access to information.255  But the access-to-
information justification is helpful in constructing a public policy basis 
for insider trading prohibitions. 
If insider trading is animated by unfair access to information, 
where should we draw the line between fair and unfair informational 
advantages?  One can imagine the equal-access-to-information theory 
ranking potential investors on a continuum with regard to the infor-
mation they possess.256  At one end of the continuum are the corpo-
rate insiders who hold secret, firm-specific information, while at the 
other extreme are the “proverbial grandparents who have little access 
to even publicly available information.”257  An insider trading law 
rooted in the access theory picks a point on the continuum at which 
investor access is considered too great and deems the investors insid-
ers for purposes of the prohibition.258  The dividing line separates le-
gal informational advantages from illegal informational advantages. 
Where do government insiders and outside actors reside on the 
continuum of access to political intelligence?  Government insiders 
represent the equivalent of corporate insiders.  Politicians and their 
staff possess intimate knowledge of legislative initiatives and have di-
rect access to decisionmakers, or they are themselves the ultimate de-
cider.  As we have seen, this assertion is supported through empirical 
research demonstrating the substantial trading advantages of U.S. 
Senators.259  In fact, as explained earlier, the evidence suggests that the 
informational advantage of Senators is greater than that of corporate 
254 Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 346 (1979). 
255 The parity-of-information theory was rejected in Dirks v. SEC.  See 463 U.S. 646, 
657 (1983) (“Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any 
notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading.”).  The equal-
access-to-information theory was rejected in Chiarella v. United States.  See 445 U.S. 222, 
235 n.20 (1980) (rejecting the proposition that persons having access to information 
that is not legally available to others should be prohibited from exploiting such infor-
mation); see also Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 4-5 (discussing the Court’s rejection of 
both theories). 
256 This concept is derived from Netter, Poulsen & Hersch, supra note 33, at 6. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 6-7. 
259 See supra subsection I.A.1. 
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insiders trading in their own firms.260  Government insiders, then, pos-
sess a monopoly over political information that places them at a dis-
tinct informational advantage over the marketplace.261 
Outside actors—lobbyists and hedge funds—reside much further 
down the continuum.  K Street lobbyists are to Washington what ana-
lysts and market professionals are to Wall Street.  Market professionals 
are analysts and researchers who expend considerable resources fer-
reting out little-known, market-moving information.  Whereas these 
market professionals have much more market information than the 
average small investor,262 lobbyists possess much more political infor-
mation than the average constituent.  Market professionals expend 
significant resources acquiring their informational advantages and 
gain these advantages “through discussions with corporate insiders, 
following the progress of important litigation, or monitoring news re-
ports and the Dow Jones tape constantly.”263  They analyze the infor-
mation and make informed, yet speculative, predictions.  Similarly, 
lobbyists keep tabs on the political pulse through discussions with 
government insiders, monitoring legislative proposals, and attending 
committee hearings. 
The information that market professionals acquire through dili-
gent research is legitimate and can be used in making investment de-
cisions.264  The Supreme Court has suggested that an informational 
advantage is improper, however, if it “cannot be overcome with re-
search or skill.”265  Since market professionals are presumed to be act-
ing on information that they gathered through “research or skill,” and 
not through exclusive insider access to information, they reside 
beyond insiders on the access to information continuum.  Through 
diligent research or investment of resources, the theory goes, any in-
vestor could access such information.266 
260 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
261 This is the basis for Professor Langevoort’s conclusion that government insid-
ers are liable under Rule 10b-5.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
262 Fisch, supra note 229, at 222. 
263 Id. at 222-23; see also MACEY, supra note 100, at 13 (“Market professionals will be 
able to obtain, assimilate, and process information about firms far more quickly than 
small investors.”). 
264 See Netter, Poulsen & Hersch, supra note 33, at 5 (“Individuals who acquire ma-
terial nonpublic information in other legal manners, such as legitimate research or 
accidental tips, may trade on it freely without disclosure.”). 
265 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997). 
266 See MACEY, supra note 100, at 22 (“[I]t could be argued . . . that everyone has 
‘equal access’ because anyone could have hired the analyst who discovers valuable in-
formation in the course of his employment.  Indeed, anyone could become an ana-
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Like analysts and market professionals, lobbyists have the skills 
and resources to read and interpret the political balance sheets of 
Washington.  Hedge funds have the resources to hire lobbyists.  Lob-
bying firms offer the Washington equivalent of the market pulse. 
Average investors could fine-tune their political savvy and access 
much of the same information that lobbyists provide, in the same way 
that they could research and access superior market information pro-
vided by analysts.  One may be surprised to find that political informa-
tion is more readily available than corporate information.  Investors 
cannot simply call up a company and demand access to decisionmak-
ers; not even shareholders of a company can make such requests.  The 
political process is (at least theoretically) more open and inclusive, as 
elected officials are responsive to their constituents.  Admittedly, po-
werful, networked lobbyists may get their phone calls to Capitol Hill 
returned more quickly than a single constituent, but in the corporate 
arena, large institutional investors or networked market professionals 
will likewise carry more weight than a single investor. 
If one accepts access to information as a theoretical underpinning 
of insider trading, one would construct a continuum of access to in-
formation that placed government insiders alongside corporate insid-
ers and placed lobbyists (and their hedge fund clients) alongside 
market professionals.  The theory would justify defining these gov-
ernment insiders as insiders for purposes of the federal securities laws.  
At the same time, the access-to-information theory would not go so far 
as to extend the definition to encompass outside actors trading on po-
litical intelligence. 
B.  Economic Justifications for Prohibiting Insider Trading 
1.  Injury to Investors 
The investor-injury argument maintains that insider trading either 
(1) causes outside investors to trade at an inaccurate price or (2) in-
duces investors to make bad purchases or sales.267 
The first theory claims that investors who trade alongside insiders 
with access to information are wronged because they bought or sold at 
lyst.”); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 254 (1991). 
267 See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 71 (stating these arguments but finding nei-
ther of them convincing). 
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a bad price—a price that did not reflect the inside information.268  
This argument is considered flawed because, on impersonal ex-
changes, one never knows with whom she is trading.269  The harm 
would occur regardless of whether the information was possessed by 
an insider or another outsider.270  “It is purely fortuitous that an insid-
er was on the other side of the transaction.”271 
The second theory provides that price discrepancies resulting 
from insider trading induce investors to make poor decisions.272  Such 
injury to investors must be prohibited, it is argued, because investor 
injury will undermine confidence in the markets,273 and market  
integrity is a fundamental aim of insider trading prohibitions.  This 
argument is discredited because, even “assuming that some investors 
are misled by those effects[,] . . . many transactions would have taken 
place regardless of the price changes resulting from insider trad-
ing.”274 
Putting aside the merits of the investor-injury justification, it ap-
pears that government insider trading would harm investors in the 
same way as corporate insider trading.  It is hard to distinguish the two 
types of insider trading on that level. 
2.  Injury to Issuers 
The issuer-injury justification is not relevant to trading on political 
intelligence.  The justification maintains that insider trading may in-
jure a firm by (1) creating incentives for those lower in the corporate 
hierarchy to delay reporting information to supervisors; (2) interfer-
ing with corporate plans, such as an insider buying stock in a target 
company during merger negotiations and thereby raising the acquisi-
tion cost; or (3) injuring the reputation of a firm.275  The issuer-injury 
argument supports a definition of insider trading that is concerned 
with harm resulting from true corporate insiders.  If anything, this jus-
tification militates against extending insider trading law to include 
those who trade on political intelligence, as government insiders can-
not possibly injure a company under any of the three threads. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 72. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 73. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 75-78. 
1506 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1451 
3.  Property Rights 
Probably the most embraced justification for insider trading pro-
hibitions is the property rights theory.276  The theory maintains that 
corporate information is property of the corporation, and that the 
“conversion of the property for the insider’s personal use is a theft.”277  
An insider or misappropriator who uses corporate property is a 
“thief,” while a tippee is the recipient of “stolen property.”278  The 
property rights approach has been discredited, however, because if in-
side information is truly corporate property, then the government 
should not involve itself in internal corporate affairs by dictating how 
those rights are allocated.279 
A prohibition on insider trading, consequently, assigns a property 
interest in inside information to the corporation.280  This theory is 
congruent to insider trading doctrine developed by the Supreme 
276 See generally MACEY, supra note 100, at 67 (“[T]he only conceivable justification 
for banning insider trading is that such trading involves the theft of valuable corporate 
property from its rightful owner.”); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regula-
tion of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861 (1983) (arguing that there exist “sever-
al incentive and information effects which suggest that there may be gains from allo-
cating property rights in valuable information to managers as opposed to investors”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Produc-
tion of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 331 (discussing the “business property ra-
tionale,” which applies only when secrecy is necessary to preserve the value of the in-
formation to the firm); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable 
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-20 (1980) (discussing the value of internal in-
formation and how it is wasteful for an external institution to have to replicate this in-
formation); Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 
759-71 (1988) (discussing the merits of a property rights approach to insider trading 
generally and advancing a Lockean theory of insider trading); Richard J. Morgan, In-
sider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 80 (1987) (arti-
culating a “policy basis for the regulation of insider trading . . . that is based on the no-
tion of inside information as property that can be owned and used by or for the benefit 
of the owner or creator of that property”); Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 78-82 (“In 
short, the federal insider trading prohibition is justifiable solely as a means of protect-
ing property rights in information.”). 
277 Fisch, supra note 229, at 224. 
278 Id. 
279 See id. at 225-26 (“[V]iewing inside information as property justifies treating the 
misappropriation of that property as theft but correspondingly requires the govern-
ment to defer to firm decisions contractually allocating the entitlement to that proper-
ty.”); see also MACEY, supra note 100, at 69 (“[T]he way to approach the problem of in-
sider trading is to identify property rights in information. . . . Thus, firms ought to be 
able to allocate the right to engage in insider trading to whomever they wish . . . .”).  
This debate is outside the scope of this Comment. 
280 See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 78 (“In effect, the federal insider trading 
prohibition vests a property right . . . in the party to whom the insider trader owes a 
fiduciary duty to refrain from self dealing in confidential information.”) 
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Court and, as a result, is intertwined with fiduciary duty concepts.  As 
elaborated above, the Court’s doctrine distinguishes between those 
who are fiduciaries or confidants of the source of the information, 
and those who are not.281  Those who are insiders cannot trade on the 
information—corporate property—to which they are privy.  The 
property rights theory maintains that this is because such trading is es-
sentially corporate thievery.282 
Under the property rights justification for insider trading regula-
tion, we must ask whether political intelligence is property, and, if so, 
whose property.  The argument necessarily depends on a showing that 
political information is property of the government and, by implica-
tion, the American public.  Theft occurs when government insiders 
steal information from the public and use it for personal gain. 
Federal corruption and bribery laws are instructive.  The federal 
bribery statute makes it a punishable offense for anyone to confer any-
thing of value upon any public official with intent “to influence any 
official act.”283  One tenable view considers government corruption to 
be “the sale by government officials of government property for personal 
gain.”284  The theory presupposes that official action is property belong-
ing to the government and that corruption is the sale thereof.  It would 
seem reasonable to say the same thing of official government informa-
tion.  By extension, then, the misappropriation of official information is 
theft of government property in the same way as corruption. 
The property rights justification for insider trading regulation 
would support an extensive ban on all trades based on material non-
public political information.  First, government insiders would be 
stealing government property when they profit from trading on politi-
cal information.  It would be impossible to distinguish the govern-
ment insider’s theft from the corporate insider’s.  Second, outside ac-
tors who trade on political intelligence would also be trading illegally 
because any information they received from Capitol Hill would be 
government property.  The hedge fund is like the tippee in the corpo-
rate context whose tip consists of “stolen property.”  Trading on stolen 
281 See supra Section II.A. 
282 It is hard to see how this differs much from self-dealing or corporate opportu-
nity doctrines that derive from duty of loyalty concepts in state corporate fiduciary duty 
law.  This may lead one to ask whether federal securities law serves any purpose beyond 
those already served by state law.  If federal securities law is justified on a property 
rights theory, then the answer appears to be “no.” 
283 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
284 ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND:  GOVERNMENT 
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 91 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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property would be misappropriation, regardless of whether there were 
a breach of confidentiality. 
4.  Corporate Governance and Moral Hazard 
Insider trading is also deemed harmful because it creates a moral 
hazard by allowing corporate insiders to profit on bad news.  Corpo-
rate insiders are able to benefit from poor decisions by selling the 
firm’s stock short or by disseminating “false information about the 
firm so that they can profit by buying and selling mispriced securi-
ties.”285  This argument claims that “allowing insiders to profit on bad 
information makes managers indifferent between working to make 
the firm prosperous and working to make it bankrupt.”286  The moral 
hazard creates a governance issue because officers may make opera-
tional decisions that are based on trading potential and not on the 
merits of the decision. 
A similar problem could arise with respect to government insiders 
who profit on legislative decisions.  Like the corporate insider who 
may bankrupt the firm for personal gain, government insiders may 
succumb to a moral hazard by making decisions based on potential 
trading gains and not on what is best for constituents.  As Part II ex-
plained, government insiders are not required to divest themselves of 
assets over which they exercise legislative jurisdiction.  What is crucial 
to realize is that insider trading regulation of government insiders will 
not solve the moral hazard or governance concerns.  Prohibiting trad-
ing on political intelligence will preclude members of Congress from 
trading after acquiring material nonpublic political information, but it 
will not keep them from voting based on preexisting portfolios.  An 
insider trading approach to political intelligence will fail to account 
for the moral hazard and corporate governance policy concerns.287 
C.  Fundamental Goal:  Financial Market Integrity 
All of the foregoing indicates that insider trading poses a threat to 
the integrity of our financial markets.  This, of course, is the funda-
mental aim of our securities laws.  Insider trading is harmful because 
it reduces confidence in the markets.  Consequently, the federal se-
285 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 266, at 260. 
286 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 276, at 873; see also MACEY, supra note 100, at 34 
(finding that the moral hazard problem presupposes managers who are better com-
pensated if the firm is doing well). 
287 I am grateful to Professor Fisch for bringing this argument to my attention. 
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curities laws restore this confidence by requiring corporations to make 
public disclosures.288  And where corporate information is not dis-
closed—where it is “inside”—insiders must refrain from trading on 
the basis of that information. 
The underlying harm associated with insider trading justifications—
undermining market integrity—does not hold up under a political-
intelligence analysis.  When government officials trade on political in-
formation, the public is indeed outraged.  Yet it is not market integrity 
that is undermined but rather governmental integrity.  Public anger is 
directed not at the financial system but at a political system that is seen 
as unethical:  it is not insider trading but political corruption. 
Observe the following logical parallels between trading by gov-
ernment insiders and corporate insiders.  Trading by government in-
siders is bad because public officials are abusing the privileges of 
elected office.  They are personally profiting at the expense of the 
public.  The damage decreases public trust and confidence in the po-
litical system.  Without trust in government, government cannot func-
tion.  Political governance laws—the Hatch Act,289 the federal bribery 
statute,290 the Federal Election Campaign Act,291 the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act,292 House and Senate ethics rules,293 and so forth—serve to 
remedy distrust in the political system. 
Trading by corporate insiders is also bad because corporate insiders 
are abusing their corporate privileges.  They are profiting at the ex-
pense of other corporate shareholders and other market participants.  
This damage decreases shareholder and investor trust in corporations 
and confidence in the financial system.  Without trust in financial mar-
kets, corporations cannot function.  The federal securities laws were de-
signed and are enforced to remedy distrust of financial markets.  Why 
288 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (“[N]ational 
public interest . . . makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such 
transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by of-
ficers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports . . . .”). 
289 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2006) (limiting the ability of federal employees to en-
gage in partisan activities). 
290 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (criminalizing bribery of public officials). 
291 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (reforming the law re-
lating to campaign communications and funding). 
292 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5 & 28 U.S.C.) (imposing several restrictions on 
public servants, including financial disclosure requirements, postemployment activity re-
strictions, and limits on the receipt of certain outside income, including gifts). 
293 See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71. 
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should the federal securities laws be charged with doing the work of 
political ethics? 
Admittedly, government insiders are market players who can af-
fect pricing through investment practices.294  With government insid-
ers, the primary danger is not a loss of public confidence in the finan-
cial system but rather a loss of confidence in the political system.  Any 
market effect is incidental and disappears once a political ethics rule 
addresses the practice.  An ethics approach would achieve the theoret-
ical goals underlying the securities laws by addressing both fairness 
and property concerns and would do so much more effectively.  The 
final Part of this Comment addresses these alternative proposals. 
V.  ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS 
This Comment has explored political-intelligence trading through 
the lens of current insider trading doctrine and its underlying justifi-
cations.  It has attempted to map insider trading law onto government 
insiders and outside actors who profit from trading on political infor-
mation.  To do so would have required stretching the doctrine to a 
point at which insider trading becomes divorced from its statutory be-
drock—the Exchange Act—the primary purpose of which is to pro-
mote market integrity through disclosure of corporate information.  It 
has never been the province of the SEC to write and enforce political 
ethics laws. 
Even still, we are no less outraged by profiteering politicians today 
than Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were over 200 years ago.  Sev-
eral theories of why we regulate insider trading—particularly unfairness 
and property rights—provide a compelling reason to bring trading by 
government insiders into the fold.  As we now see, these concerns are 
more effectively and appropriately remedied through political ethics 
laws, not by mutilating insider trading doctrine beyond recognition. 
A.  Nature and Characteristics of Political Intelligence 
The analysis so far has revealed several characteristics of political 
intelligence that distinguish it from the material nonpublic informa-
tion at issue in classic insider trading cases, thereby making coverage 
under the federal securities laws inappropriate.  This Section briefly 
294 Arguably, government insider trading affects the markets to a much lesser ex-
tent than corporate insider trading because government insiders are a relatively small 
and defined group. 
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summarizes these differences as they pertain specifically to govern-
ment insiders and outside actors. 
1.  Government Insiders 
First, the primary harm of allowing government insiders to trade 
on political information is the threat to governmental integrity.  Poli-
ticians’ abuses of authority are addressed by ethics rules and political 
governance laws.  The federal bribery statute,295 for example, prohibits 
the sale of political deeds and could suitably address conversion of 
government information for personal profit.  Accordingly, perceived 
corruption associated with government insiders’ trading should be 
addressed through ethics reform. 
Second, to the extent that governmental insider trading impacts 
financial markets, the impact is small.  Politicians are a discrete, de-
fined group, unlike expansive corporate circles.  At most, any harm is 
incidental and disappears once the primary harm is remedied 
through ethics laws. 
Third, when insiders trade on political intelligence, a fiduciary du-
ty in the traditional insider trading sense is never breached.  Part II 
applied current doctrine to political intelligence and revealed a fun-
damental weakness.  Namely, our insider trading doctrine is inextric-
ably linked with concepts of corporate fiduciary duties, which are dif-
ficult to impose on government insiders, let alone outside actors. 
2.  Outside Actors 
First, political intelligence is information that, unlike corporate in-
formation, has a public ownership component.  Namely, democracy ac-
cords the public a right to meet with and receive information from 
their elected officials.  In the earlier discussion of property rights, it was 
argued that the public owns governmental information and can de-
mand access to it.296  This is a presumption of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, for example, which requires the government to release infor-
mation to any person requesting it unless an exemption applies.297  This 
is not to say that all political information is “public” in the sense that it 
is widely known.  The important distinction here is that the nature of 
political information is public, whereas the nature of corporate infor-
295 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
296 See supra subsection IV.B.3. 
297 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. I 2009). 
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mation is private.  Public ownership of information and access to public 
information make it difficult to argue that political information is 
equivalent to inside corporate information, which is privately held.  
Such a finding certainly undermines any claim that outside actors are 
improperly trading on political information, as the outside actors could 
be perceived as merely exercising their democratic rights.298 
Second, trading on political intelligence is highly speculative be-
cause it is seldom based on concrete or firm-specific information.  
Political intelligence is far different than the quintessential corpo-
rate inside information.  Lobbying firms rarely claim to provide 
“hot” tips but rather offer general political analysis.299  Lobbyists may 
gather a dozen tidbits of information from talking with congression-
al staff, monitoring legislation, reading the news, or attending con-
gressional hearings.  They interpret each separate piece of informa-
tion and make their best prediction of future legislative activity.  The 
information is relayed to the hedge fund client, who then speculates 
as to how the market will react in the event that the legislative pre-
diction rings true.  There are at least two layers of speculation.  Polit-
ical-intelligence trading is at least as speculative, if not more so, than 
trading on information gathered by market analysts and researchers, 
which is perfectly legal.300  Moreover, it is a far cry from firm-specific 
298 It is much easier to argue that government insiders are converting public prop-
erty because their elected positions give them unique access to information unattainable 
by any other person.  This does not disrupt the argument as it pertains to outside ac-
tors, since all persons have equal access to political intelligence.  Equal access, not 
equal resources, is what matters. 
299 See Snyder, supra note 100 (“Lobbyists say they more often provide their Wall 
Street clients with information about how Washington works, rather than hot tips that 
could move stocks.”).  “Hot” political tips are at best market information.  Unlike “in-
side information,” which is derived from within the corporation, market information is 
information that “originates from sources other than the issuer and involves events or 
circumstances concerning or affecting the price or market for the issuer’s securities 
and does not concern the issuer’s assets or earning power.”  Bainbridge, supra note 
131, at 16; see also SZOCKYJ, supra note 248, at 5 (describing the reach of insider trading 
law beyond information from the issuer or about earnings to information that could 
affect market prices).  Both forms of information are covered by insider trading law.  
Chiarella, for example, was said to be trading on market information that he obtained 
from tender offer documents because the information was not obtained from the issu-
er in which he traded but did affect the issuer’s market price.  Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980).  The information Chiarella received was firm spe-
cific and certain.  Even the best political information will, in most cases, only be gener-
al market information that may or may not affect a host of companies within a given 
affected industry. 
300 See supra Section IV.A. 
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corporate inside information at issue in landmark insider trading 
cases and scandals. 
Third, outside actors who gather political intelligence are no dif-
ferent than market analysts.  This Part concludes by arguing that not 
only are outside actors performing a legitimate function equivalent to 
market professionals but also that their information gathering is bene-
ficial for market efficiency and should not be discouraged. 
B.  Proposals 
These characteristics of political information militate against 
bringing it within the purview of the federal securities laws.  Yet, in all 
likelihood, some of this trading should be prohibited.  To that end, 
the following proposals are made. 
1.  Blind Trusts:  An Ethics Approach to Regulating Trading by 
Members of Congress and Selected Staff 
Members of Congress and certain staff301 should be required to put 
their assets in blind trusts upon assuming their positions.  How would 
the blind trust requirement work?  A model already exists but at present 
is only optional.  The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 imposes finan-
cial disclosure requirements on public officials in all three branches of 
government.302  The Act requires public officials and certain employees 
to disclose their financial assets annually.303  To avoid disclosure of exact 
investments, however, covered individuals can elect to maintain assets 
in a blind trust.304  A “qualified blind trust” provides “an optional me-
chanism for circumventing full disclosure of financial interests while at 
the same time avoiding conflicts with official duties.”305  It is “blind” be-
cause it regulates communications between the trustee and “interested 
party,” so that a trustee “shall not consult or notify any interested par-
301 This Comment does not delve into the specifics of which staff members 
should be required to maintain blind trusts but leaves that to legislative determina-
tion or further debate. 
302 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
2, 5 & 28 U.S.C.); see also Megan J. Ballard, The Shortsightedness of Blind Trusts, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 43, 43-44 (2007) (“The Federal Ethics in Government Act requires certain 
national policymakers and employees to publicly disclose their financial interests on an 
annual basis.”). 
303 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(a) (2006). 
304 See Ballard, supra note 302, at 44, 51. 
305 Id. at 49. 
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ty.”306  In essence, only the trustee will know which securities are held in 
the trust, thereby making the member of Congress “blind” to the com-
position of the trust.  As a result, members will be unable to make legis-
lative decisions that positively impact their portfolios.  Moreover, they 
will be unable to trade on political information since investment au-
thority will be delegated entirely to the trustee. 
Some members of Congress have voluntarily elected to maintain 
assets in blind trusts.307  Though the operation of blind trusts in the 
legislative branch has received scrutiny308—namely, for lax enforce-
ment—the more stringent application in the executive branch pro-
vides a viable model to follow.309 
A blind-trust approach is superior to regulating political intelli-
gence through securities laws for several reasons.  First, the blind-trust 
requirement adequately addresses the public policy concerns underly-
ing insider trading law that were identified in Part IV by categorically 
precluding government insiders from being market participants.  Fur-
ther, such an approach is “fair” because it precludes those with access 
to inside information from trading on it.  It also is a way to prevent 
“theft” of public property by government insiders, because there is no 
way for government insiders to reap financial gain.  Lastly, it addresses 
the moral hazard governance concerns that are left unmitigated un-
der an insider trading approach. 
Second, the blind-trust approach leaves current insider trading doc-
trine in place.  As the analysis in Part II demonstrated, applying insider 
trading doctrine to the government context is particularly troublesome.  
306 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(f)(3)(C)(i). 
307 See Len Costa, A Wink and a Nod, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 18, 19 (report-
ing that, as of 2006, eighteen U.S. Senators and several U.S. Representatives main-
tained qualified blind trusts). 
308 See Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48, at 
4-5 (proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski) (arguing that blind trusts are a good 
idea for members of Congress but that that the “rules [must] be tightened to clearly 
define a blind trust making them absolutely blind”); Ballard, supra note 302, at 43 (cri-
ticizing Senator Frist’s blind trust for not being truly blind); Costa, supra note 307, at 
19 (discussing the failure of Senator Frist’s blind trust and noting that “Congress has 
never been very effective at applying its ethics rules to itself”). 
309 As one commentator notes, 
Many legal experts and good-government advocates still contend that blind 
trusts can be an effective safeguard against conflicts of interest; they point to 
the successful use of blind trusts in the executive branch and believe that, if 
Congress were to adopt the same culture of strict enforcement, abuses like 
those allegedly committed by Frist would be far less likely. 
Costa, supra note 307, at 19. 
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There is considerable disagreement over the scope of current doctrine.  
This Comment has suggested throughout that there is no place in sec-
tion 10(b) for politics.  To hold government officials liable as inside 
traders would be to mistake our government for a corporation.  Even if 
one disagrees with the argument, it is difficult to deny that the insider 
trading approach is murky, that applying current doctrine is a real 
stretch, and that using the federal securities laws to regulate govern-
ment officials is highly suspect.  The blind-trust requirement would 
achieve the same objectives as insider trading regulation without defin-
ing section 10(b) away from its statutory foundation. 
Third, the blind-trust approach is more effective at preventing 
abuse than the insider trading approach.  An insider trading prohibi-
tion may prevent members of Congress from making investment deci-
sions based on political information, but it will not prevent them from 
making political decisions based on their preexisting market posi-
tions.  This means that under an insider trading regime, members of 
Congress will still be able to vote in a way that maximizes their portfo-
lio values.  As propounded in Part I, current congressional ethics laws 
do not require members to divest themselves or to refrain from voting 
on matters in which they have a financial interest.  Insider trading can 
account only for the use of information in the market but cannot pre-
vent abuse of position.  The latter is an enormous concern because 
governmental decisions affect entire markets, whereas effects from a 
single government insider trade are limited.  Further, politicians’ de-
cisionmaking vis-à-vis their market positions is the pinnacle of corrup-
tion and threatens government integrity. 
Fourth, a blind-trust requirement provides certainty.  Government 
officials will not need to worry about navigating the murky terrain of in-
sider trading law.  Rather, our public officials will be able to go about 
their jobs certain that they are acting legally.  Fifth, an ethics approach 
avoids another legislative “fix” to our already ad hoc insider trading re-
gime.  As Part II’s discussion of current doctrine illustrated, insider 
trading law is ill-defined.  It is comprised of legislative mandates, judi-
cial interpretation, and SEC application and enforcement.  The con-
tours of insider trading are difficult to ascertain.  A legislative approach 
to bring government insiders under section 10(b), such as the Baird-
Slaughter bills, would only add to the confusion.  Part III notes that the 
United Kingdom has adopted this approach, but it has been in the con-
text of a comprehensive legislative definition of insider trading.  The 
United States is far from having such a comprehensive definition. 
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A blind-trust requirement may be subject to various attacks.  Of 
course, it will be argued that the requirement may deter (wealthy) in-
dividuals from seeking public office.  However, not only have some 
current members of Congress elected to establish blind trusts, but 
such a requirement is much less onerous than alternatives—namely, 
complete divestiture.  With blind trusts, members of Congress will 
continue to be active market participants, cognizant of the returns on 
their portfolios.  Blind trusts will not “insulate a legislator from the 
personal and economic interests” of her constituency—a primary con-
cern with divestiture.310 
A more legitimate criticism concerns whether trusts containing 
non–publicly traded assets, such as ownership interests in a family 
business, can ever be deemed “blind.”  Trusts are not considered 
“blind” until the covered individual—here, the member of Congress—
no longer knows the holdings of the trust.  Of course, the member will 
be aware of the specific assets held by the trust when it is formed, and 
it is only when the trustee disposes of those specific assets, while pur-
chasing new assets, that the trust qualifies as “blind.”311  The question 
then becomes how a trustee can dispose of non–publicly traded assets 
in order to qualify as blind, or whether the member would even want 
to relinquish ownership stake in, say, a family business.  First, with re-
gard to non–publicly traded assets, trustees could sell them in the pri-
vate market, just not as easily as if the assets were traded on a public 
exchange.  Second, the question of a family business is more challeng-
ing.  One solution would be to make a de minimis exception allowing 
trusts to hold family businesses but require the members to recuse 
themselves from votes that would potentially affect the business.  The 
quintessential family business only infrequently will be materially af-
fected by national lawmaking and, accordingly, is unlikely to present 
many conflicts.  We should be much more concerned with members’ 
investments in large corporations, such as the asbestos-using firms dis-
cussed above, that are routinely affected by ongoing legislation. 
310 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (citing HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra 
note 69, at 250; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 124). 
311 See Ballard, supra note 302, at 52 (“When a public official first establishes a 
qualified blind trust, it cannot actually be ‘blind.’  By virtue of the newness of the trust, 
the official knows what assets he transferred into it until a trustee notifies him that the 
trust no longer holds the asset.”). 
2010] Cashing in on Capitol Hill 1517 
2.  Disclosure by Outside Actors:  Shining Light on  
Political-Intelligence Activities 
Political-intelligence firms are the Washington equivalent of mar-
ket professionals—analysts and researchers who expend considerable 
time and resources to extract little-known, market-moving informa-
tion.  Part IV showed how market professionals are not deemed “in-
siders.”  The reasoning is that these researchers and analysts are simp-
ly taking advantage of skills and training that are attainable by any 
investor with the proper resources.  Since virtually no one subscribes 
to a view that all investors must possess the same resources, there is 
nothing inherently unfair about trading on information derived by 
market professionals. 
Applying this rationale to K Street leads to the conclusion that 
Washington lobbyists perform this same function.  Any constituent 
can access her member of Congress, follow political news, and track 
legislative development, even without a lobbyist.  Since access to in-
formation is not a problem, there is nothing “unfair” about hiring a 
lobbyist to provide political intelligence. 
Against this backdrop, however, is the political integrity concern 
that discreet, coordinated efforts by high-powered lobbyists may un-
dermine public trust in government.  This is the exact concern ani-
mating public disclosure by lobbyists who seek to influence legislation.  
Disclosure requirements, then, should be extended to cover those 
who also seek to gain strategic information from Congress for trading 
purposes.  To that end, the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act intro-
duced by Representatives Baird and Slaughter in 2008 provides an ex-
cellent vehicle. 
Once implemented, disclosure of political-intelligence activities 
puts members of Congress and their staff on notice.  Capitol Hill can 
decide when and with whom to share information.  In the asbestos ex-
ample, Senator Frist’s office would have at least known that it was dis-
closing the upcoming vote to hedge funds who, presumably, would 
trade.  If Senator Frist’s office decided to release the information any-
way, it would be signaling that the information is not confidential.  
Accordingly, the member of Congress makes the conscious decision 
whether information will be public or not.  Lastly, disclosure keeps the 
public advised of the potential for political corruption by making po-
litical-intelligence gathering practices more well-known. 
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C.  Chilling Effects 
At the outset, this Comment warned that we should not lose sight 
of public policy objectives, which is easy to do when dealing with such 
demonized figures as lobbyists, hedge funds, and politicians who are 
perceived as corrupt.  Bringing trading on political intelligence into 
the fold of federal securities law loses sight of the bigger picture.  One 
concern with the insider trading approach is that it will make political 
information inherently potent and thereby chill political dialogue312 
and efficient markets.313  Whether under the current doctrine, with its 
great uncertainty, or a statutory approach that explicitly prohibits 
trading on political information, those who possess political know-
ledge will be playing with fire. 
1.  Don’t Make It a Crime to Write My Congressman 
Making political information potentially incriminating will threat-
en the political process.  Central to legislative decisionmaking is 
communication between elected officials and their constituents.  Con-
stituents reach out to Capitol Hill to stay informed and make their 
312 One law firm has made the argument that the Baird-Slaughter legislation will 
have a “chilling effect” on political participation:   
[T]he STOCK Act could have a direct, chilling effect on the free interchange 
of information between the Hill and outside lobbyists.   
In its most far-reaching provision, H.R. 5015 would prohibit Members and 
staff, as well as individuals off the Hill, from disclosing material nonpublic in-
formation obtained on the Hill regarding legislation if they have reason to be-
lieve that the information will be used to buy or sell securities.  This means 
that Members and staff would have to think twice before sharing otherwise 
confidential information with any lobbyist or other individual who might con-
ceivably use the information for personal investment purposes.  Given that 
this would be a criminal provision, some Members and staffers might be ex-
pected to curtail the sharing of valuable information related to legislation.  
Moreover, a lobbyist who learned confidential information from a Member or 
staffer would be at risk if they shared that information with others who then 
traded on the information. 
COVINGTON & BURLING, PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON CONGRESSIONAL “INSIDER TRADING” 
COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING IMPACT ON LOBBYISTS 2 (2006), http://www.cov.com/ 
publications (follow “E-Alert & Advisory” hyperlink; then follow “2006” hyperlink).   
313 Subsequent to the drafting of this Comment but prior to publication, a con-
gressional committee received testimony from Professor Verret, who similarly argued 
that regulating investors’ use of political information would inhibit market efficiency.  
Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48, available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/oihr_070609.shtml 
(proposed statement of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univer-
sity School of Law). 
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views known.  This is important to democracy because it keeps law-
makers in touch with those they govern and guards against congres-
sional insularity.  Likewise, lawmakers reach out to constituent groups 
for feedback on prospective legislation, to vet ideas, and to build con-
sensus.  For example, when Congress was considering the public trust 
fund for claims against asbestos manufacturers, it most certainly 
reached out to the trade associations representing the victims as well 
as the manufacturers.  This dialogue is valuable because it leads to 
better-informed and politically viable legislation. 
The insider trading approach will potentially make criminals out 
of those who write their elected representatives.  Although falling into 
the trap is more complicated than merely writing Congress, this is the 
public perception that will prevail.  The perception of members giving 
political inside information to constituents is enough to chill vital dis-
course.  Members of Congress will be reluctant to exchange ideas with 
constituent groups, and constituents will hesitate to monitor their 
elected officials.  The result will be an isolated legislative body, scared 
to bounce ideas off of others, and an American public that views polit-
ical knowledge as incriminating. 
Equally important are the functions that lobbyists serve.  Though 
vilified, lobbyists are essential to the political process.  They act as 
translators to their clients, interpreting political maneuvers and ob-
scure legislative processes.  This intermediation is essential for many 
groups to strategize about and effectively participate in the political 
process.  Insider trading regulation of political-intelligence gathering 
will inhibit lobbyists from performing these functions, thereby threat-
ening our participatory democracy.  Any benefit of bringing political-
intelligence trading into the insider trading regime must be weighed 
against these paramount threats to the democratic political process. 
2.  Don’t Discourage Market Efficiency 
An efficient market is one “in which security prices reflect infor-
mation instantaneously.”314  The idea is that stock prices reflect infor-
mation that is available to the public, including past prices and cur-
rent performance.315  Several forms of market efficiency—weak, 
semistrong, and strong—are distinguished by the amount of informa-
314 BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 56, at G-5. 
315 Id. at 359. 
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tion that is reflected in a security’s price.316  Market efficiency is good 
because it allows securities to be fairly and accurately priced. 
A substantial amount of information that comes to the market is 
not publicly released but rather is uncovered by market professionals 
who expend significant resources to discover the information.  It is 
well understood that market professionals “who expend the resources 
necessary to develop valuable information about a firm should be al-
lowed to profit from it” as long as they are not breaching a fiduciary 
duty.317  Furthermore, market professionals’ activities should be en-
couraged because they lead to efficient markets.  These “informed 
traders” make purchases and sales using their informational advan-
tages, thereby protecting even the “uninformed by driving prices to 
their correct levels and making it safe to buy in ignorance.”318 
Lobbyists are Washington’s market professionals.  To the same ex-
tent that market professionals’ activities are valued for helping to effi-
ciently expose corporate information and accurately price stocks, K 
Street lobbyists are exposing political information.  Why distinguish 
lobbyists from market professionals, as the Baird-Slaughter legislation 
proposes?  Not only would doing so be inconsistent, it is undesirable 
to discourage outside actors from expending resources to ensure effi-
cient markets.  Mining nonpublic information does not simply help 
the direct recipient of the information, but encourages accuracy of 
prices, efficiency of markets, and protection of all investors. 
CONCLUSION 
Attempts to regulate trading based on political intelligence under 
the federal securities laws are misguided.  First, government insiders’ 
use of information acquired as a result of their official positions is not 
insider trading, it is political corruption.  An insider trading approach 
only addresses one angle of the picture and leaves political insiders able 
to make legislative decisions that maximize existing portfolios.  Political 
316 Id.  The weak form of efficiency posits that current stock prices reflect past 
prices.  Id.  The semistrong form asserts that current prices reflect past prices as well as 
all “other published information, such as you might get from reading the financial 
press.”  Id.  The strong form argues that current prices reflect all the information that 
could possibly be acquired through a thorough analysis of the corporation and the 
market.  Id. 
317 MACEY, supra note 100, at 4; see also id. at 68 (“Market professionals, who ac-
quire a trading advantage by engaging in research rather than by breaching a fiduciary 
duty, are free to trade.”). 
318 Id. at 28. 
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corruption should be addressed by ethics laws, not by distorting U.S. se-
curities law.  Specifically, a blind trust achieves the policy goals underly-
ing insider trading law while more effectively combating congressional 
conflicts.  Second, outside actors who acquire, disseminate, and trade 
upon political information from government sources, without an expli-
cit agreement of confidentiality, are doing nothing wrong.  These actors 
are equivalent to market professionals, who devote resources to ferret-
ing out information that is available to anyone.  This service is essential 
to the efficient functioning of our capital markets. 
 
